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Michael Abramowiczt
In administrative law, the market paradigm has led to revolution, as
policymakers have followed commentators in turning from command-and-
control regulation to incentives. This reconceptualization, however, has left
one aspect of administrative law untouched: administrative adjudication. This
neglect is unjustified, as the Article shows that adjudication itself could be
accomplished through market processes. In an administrative market, the
government would auction off rights to a fraction of any judgment award that
an administrative agency might ultimately win against a given corporation.
Such a market would reward third-party efforts to gather relevant information
by allowing those possessing private information to trade on it. With further
refinement, the government could use this market to determine what the final
judgment against the corporation should be, thus supplanting traditional
adjudication.
At first glance the proposal might seem likely to lead to inaccurate
judgments. The Article, however, explains that the government could give
traders incentives to price securities accurately by adjudicating a small
percentage of randomly selected claims. Traders who overvalue securities
would lose enough money in these randomly selected cases that traders ex
ante would always act as if every claim will be adjudicated. Thus, the
government would tether the market to traditional adjudicative norms,
ensuring that it gives litigants due process even when their cases are not
selected for traditional adjudication.
The Article demonstrates that the resulting "partially supplanting
administrative market" helps to economize on judicial process. The market,
though, does more than that: It can serve as an alternative to qui tam
litigation, and it encourages regulators to craft regulations at higher levels of
generality. The Article concludes by suggesting that the vast information-
processing power of capital markets could shrink administrative agencies
while improving their functioning.
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Introduction
Administrative agencies are beset by a triad of scarcity problems. First,
when investigating potential regulatory breaches, agencies often cannot
deploy an adequate number of investigators.' Second, once disputes lead to
1. See infra notes 36, 187 and accompanying text; see also Christen Carlson White, Regulation
of Leaky Underground Fuel Tanks: An Anatomy of Regulatory Failure, 14 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
105, 170 (1995-96) (providing an example of how the underfunding of enforcement of a regulatory
program can undermine the program as a whole); cf. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE
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administrative adjudication, both agency attorneys and administrative law
judges (ALJs) are often swamped by their caseloads.2 Finally, in the informal
rulemaking process, a shortage of expert personnel may limit rulemaking
activities,3 cause delay,4 and prevent an agency from drafting rules that
produce desired results when applied to all species of idiosyncratic
circumstance.' Together, these scarcity problems hamper agencies' ability to
regulate effectively at each stage of the regulatory process.
The simplest solution to the various problems of administrative scarcity
would be to increase agency size: hire more experts to draft regulations, place
more investigators on the trail of regulatory outlaws, and increase the number
of lawyers and judges.6 The effectiveness of a bureaucracy, however, may
PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 63-64, 70 (1992) (arguing
that judges should consider underfunded agency programs as effectively repealed); Melinda R. Kassen,
The Inadequacies of Congressional Attempts to Legislate Federal Facility Compliance with
Environmental Requirements, 54 MD. L. REv. 1475, 1487-91 (1995) (describing how the underfunding
of compliance efforts by federal agencies has led to a failure by such agencies to adhere to
environmental laws).
2. See A. Leo Levin & Michael E. Kunz, Thinking About Judgeships, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1627,
1649 (1995) (noting "the sheer volume of cases that [ALJs] decide-approaching 700,000 a year-and
the variety of matters that they handle"); see also Alan W. Heifetz, ALIS, ADR, and ADP: The Future of
Administrative Adjudication, I WIDENER J. PUB. L. 13, 13 (1992) (predicting that the "most dramatic
effect" on administrative adjudication "will come from efforts to manage that caseload efficient and
expeditiously"); Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1341, 1343 (1992) ("[T]he ALJs probably decide more 'cases' each year than do their federal
judicial counterparts."); cf Jerry L. Mashaw, Organizing Adjudication: Reflections on the Prospects for
Artisans in the Age of Robots, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1055, 1056 (1992) ("Adjudication not only breaks
down hierarchy and decentralizes agency discretion, it is also notoriously slow and expensive.... From
the administrative perspective, therefore, adjudication is work better performed by robots than by
artisans.").
3. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1396 (1992) ("Certainly, if more resources were plowed into rulemaking initiatives, the
agencies would be less reluctant to undertake controversial rulemaking projects, to revisit old rules, and
to write more flexible rules in the first place."); Emerson H. Tiller, Controlling Policy by Controlling
Process: Judicial Influence on Regulatory Decision Making, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 1998)
(manuscript at 9) (providing an economic model that shows how "a change in agency resources can
affect policy discretion," given the imposition of process requirements by courts as a means of
controlling regulatory decisionmaking); see also Steven J. Groseclose, Reinventing the Regulatory
Agenda: Conclusions from an Empirical Study of EPA Clean Air Act Rulemaking Projections, 53 MD. L.
REv. 521, 533-34 (1994) (citing inadequate funding as one factor that "prevents realistic agenda setting
and deadline compliance").
4. See McGarity, supra note 3, at 1396-436 (discussing various factors that may delay or derail
rulemaking processes).
5. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557 (1992) (showing that the cost of drafting detailed regulations may counsel toward elaboration of
regulations through adjudication).
6. Cf. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Government Isn't the Root of All Evil, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 1998,
at A14 ("[lI]t is increasingly evident that laissez-faire is not a cure-all."). But see PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE
DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994) (arguing for a smaller federal
government); Richard Rahn, Cutting the Government to Size, WASH. TIMES, May 11, 1995, at A19
(arguing that historical evidence indicates smaller government size is conducive to economic growth).
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decrease with size.7 Further, given an electorate that favors small government,
increasing the size of an administrative agency is often not politically feasible.
A variety of other proposals and initiatives have, directly or indirectly, aimed
at the scarcity problem. Among salient options, with varying degrees of
effectiveness, are simplification of the administrative rulemaking process,8
increased delegation of regulatory tasks to states,9 regulatory negotiation,"
promulgation of nonacquiescence policies," regulatory moratoria,12 use of
See generally J. Stephen Ferris & Edwin G. West, Testing Theories of Government Size: US.
Experience, 1959-89, 62 S. ECON. J. 537 (1996); Georgios Karras, The Optimal Government Size:
Further International Evidence on the Productivity of Government Services, 34 ECON. INQ. 193 (1996).
7. See Joel D. Schwartz, Liberty, Democracy, and the Origins of American Bureaucracy, 97
HARV. L. RaV. 815, 815 (1984) (book review) ("Bureaucracy fragments power, routinizes decision
making, institutionalizes the influence of client interest groups, and, above all, insulates public policy
from the shifting concerns of democratic majorities."). But cf. William V. Roth, Jr., The
"Malmanagement " Problem: Finding the Roots of Government Waste, Fraud, and Abuse, 58 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 961, 967 (1983) (noting that measures of government size may understate the influence of
the federal government, which relies on third parties such as states to carry out many of its regulatory
mandates).
8. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, Direct Final Rulemaking, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1995)
(advocating a procedure allowing an agency to propose a rule that will become effective absent adverse
comment); cf. Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J.
381 (arguing against proposals to make nonlegislative rulemaking more like notice-and-comment
informal rulemaking).
9. See, e.g., Surface Transportation and Transit Empowerment Act, S. 1494, 105th Cong. (1997)
(providing for devolution of federal transportation programs to state governments); Peter H. Schuck,
Introduction: Some Reflections on the Federalism Debate, YALE J. ON REG.-YALE L. & POL'Y REV.,
Symposium Issue, 1996, at 1, 4 ("Federalism now serves both as an instrument of the modem
administrative state and as a rather flexible institutional accommodation to the extraordinary diversity of
American society and to the challenges that this diversity poses for national unity."); cf Arthur Earl
Bonfield, State Law in the Teaching of Administrative Law: A Critical Analysis of the Status Quo, 61
TEX. L. RV. 95, 100-01 (1982) (arguing that state administrative law rivals federal administrative law
in importance).
10. See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,701, 30,708-09
(proposed July 15, 1982) (providing the Administrative Conference of the United States's
recommendations for negotiated rulemaking); see also Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C.A.
§§ 561-570 (West 1997). But see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look
at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206 (1994) (arguing that the case for regulatory negotiation
has been overstated and that agencies should look toward creating market incentives instead). See
generally Lawrence Susskind & Gerald McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking,
3 YALE J. ON REG. 133 (1985) (arguing that negotiated rulemaking could alleviate concerns about
agency accountability and legitimacy).
11. See, e.g., Application by the Social Security Administration (SSA) of Federal Circuit Court
and District Court Decisions, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,470, 34,470-71 (1996) (requiring social security
adjudicators not to acquiesce to court rulings); Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz,
Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 748-49 (1989) (arguing that
acquiescence to inconsistent circuit court rulings by administrative agencies could impose significant
social costs). See generally Dan T. Coenen, The Constitutional Case Against Intracircuit
Nonacquiescence, 75 MINN. L. RV. 1339 (1991); Samuel Figler, Executive Agency Nonacquiescence to
Judicial Opinions, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1664, 1674 (1993); Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence,
Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815 (1989).
12. See, e.g., Regulatory Transition Act of 1995, H.R. 450, 104th Cong. (1995).
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statistical adjudication to resolve large numbers of claims, 3 reduction of
procedural rights for litigants in administrative adjudications, 4 incorporation
of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures into the regulatory
process, 5 and heavier reliance on whistleblower suits 6 and "citizen suits."'7
The red tape of government process exacerbates the scarcity problems that
beset administrative agencies to such a degree that two commentators have
even suggested privatizing agencies altogether. 8 As long as the objectives of
an administrative agency are clearly defined, 9 the reasoning goes, the right to
13. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Glen 0. Robinson, Aggregative Valuation of Mass Tort Claims,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 137; Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights,
Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1993); Michael J. Saks &
Peter D. Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefit of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial
of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815 (1992).
14. See A.C. Pritchard, Note, Government Promises and Due Process: An Economic Analysis of
the "'New Property," 77 VA. L. REv. 1053, 1053-54 (1991) ("[T]he time has come to rethink the
justification for procedural protection of government benefits and to ask whether the current doctrine is
consistent with those justifications."); see also Jon C. Dubin, Torquemada Meets Kafka: The
Misapplication of the Issue Exhaustion Doctrine to Inquisitorial Administrative Proceedings, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1289, 1290-91 (1997) ("[A]gencies have often eschewed fully judicialized procedure in
adjudication from sheer bureaucratic necessity, due to the imposing volume of cases adjudicated.").
15. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990)
(allowing agencies to submit voluntarily to ADR proceedings); see also Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.A. §§
571-584 (West Supp. 1997)) (providing several improvements on the original act). See generally Senator
Charles E. Grassley & Charles Pou, Jr., Congress, the Executive Branch and the Dispute Resolution
Process, 1992 J. DISPuTE RESOL. 1; Cynthia B. Dauber, Note & Comment, The Ties That Do Not Bind:
Nonbinding Arbitration in Federal Administrative Agencies, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 165 (1995); Margaret
Ward, Legislative Development, Public Fuss in a Private Forum, 2 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REv. 217
(1997) (discussing the reenactment of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act).
16. See, e.g., Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich:
Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REv. 273 (1992). See
generally Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 341-44 (1989)
(offering a concise history of qui tam litigation); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney
General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215 (1983)
(assessing incentives provided by qui tam suits); William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as
Monitoring Devices in Government Contracting, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1799 (1996) (assessing the
success of the False Claims Act). The classic economic works on the private enforcement of law are
Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); and William L. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of
Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975).
17. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994) (authorizing environmental citizen suits). For a thoughtful
overview and critique of such suits, see Frank B. Cross, Rethinking Environmental Citizen Suits, 8
TEMPLE ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 55 (1989). See also Stephen Fotis, Comment, Private Enforcement of the
Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, 35 AM. U. L. REv. 127 (1985).
18. See Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3 YALE J. ON
REG. 167, 168 (1985) (noting that "private firms are generally more efficiently operated than public
agencies").
19. See id. at 176 ("An institution will be said to be privately enforceable when it includes
mechanisms that make it in the self-interest of enforcement agents to perform according to the desires of
the policymaker.").
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act as the administrative agency could be auctioned off to the highest bidder.2
If the privatized agency is rewarded for accomplishing the regulatory goals, or
punished for failing to meet them, it will have every incentive to create an
efficient regulatory structure.21 This solution is unabashedly radical-it
presents the risk that a single private firm might believe that it has found the
best method for accomplishing regulation and thus bid the most, yet prove
dead wrong.22
My approach to the problem of process scarcity is different. Although it
retains a confidence in the power of markets, it would leave regulatory
decisions to legislators and administrative agencies. The solution is not to
privatize administrative agencies lock, stock, and barrel, but to privatize the
process of administrative adjudication, with safeguards designed to ensure that
the privatization could achieve the same results as traditional administrative
adjudication. I do not, however, write in praise of ADR.23 Though arguably
more efficient than traditional administrative adjudication, ADR ultimately
addresses only one of the three prongs of the administrative agency scarcity
20. See id. at 178 ("[T]he government would auction off the right to enforce... regulations to an
enforcement agent in the private sector.").
21. See id. at 189 ("A private enforcer... will have the correct incentives to enable the evolution
of efficient rules governing the implementation of public policy, since its incentives are purely economic
and are structured to reflect the social costs and benefits of implementation.").
22. If markets for corporate control are efficient and the privatized agercy is publicly held, then
control of the agency would always flow to the owners thought by the market to be best able to
maximize the firm's value, and thus indirectly the policymaker's objectives. See Gregg A. Jarrell, State
Anti-Takeover Laws and the Efficient Allocation of Corporate Control: An Economic Analysis of Edgar
v. MITE, 2 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 111, 112 (1983) ("[A] well-functioning market for corporate control,
using tender offers and mergers, ensures that the most efficient teams manage publicly-held firms."); cf
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to
a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981) (arguing that passivity by managers of target firms
should be legally required to provide a constraint on unfaithful management). There are two problems,
however, with relying on the market after the initial auction to ensure that the owners of the firm are
always value-maximizing. First, markets for corporate control may not be efficient, so the market may
fail to correct for small policymaking inefficiencies. See Zohar Goshen, Shareholder Dividend Options,
104 YALE L.J. 881, 893 (1995) ("Managers are free to deviate from efficient performance as long as they
do not cause a price decline that exceeds the costs of a takeover."). Second, the privatized agency may
not place enough weight on the variance of possible outcomes. That is, the agency's shareholders are
likely to have diversified portfolios and thus to be relatively unconcerned about the variance in the
expected value of the agency. See generally Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77
(1952) (introducing modem portfolio theory). Thus, if the government were to reward a privatized motor
vehicle safety agency (to take an example from Cohen & Rubin, supra note 18, at 177-81) by paying the
agency for each life saved, the privatized agency might adopt a regulatory program with a slightly higher
expected number of lives saved but a high variance. For example, some safety regulation might, with a
very small probability, be expected to save a large number of lives, but with a very large probability cost
lives. This uncertainty might be a large cost to the governmental policymaker. Since the government's
reward to the privatized agency depends on the ultimate success of its projects, however, the
policymaker would be unable to induce the agency to take this ex ante uncertainty cost into account.
23. A criticism of ADR from another perspective is Eric K. Yamamoto, ADR: Where Have All
the Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1055 (1996).
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problem-overwhelming caseloads-and it differs from traditional
adjudication primarily in procedural and evidentiary details. Instead, the
proposal that I offer would accomplish the task of administrative adjudication
through a capital market structure: It would rely on traders to buy and sell
securities corresponding to various legal claims, and judgments would
ultimately depend on the prices at which such securities are exchanged.
This proposal draws a parallel between markets and courts. In recent
years, commentators have noted the information-processing capabilities of
capital markets.24 Courts process information too, with judges and juries
considering law and facts in reaching judgments. Perhaps recognizing the
similarity, scholars have suggested capital-market approaches to torts, 25 mass
torts,26 and bankruptcy.27 A non-legal writer has even trumpeted an "idea
futures" market.28 In all of these cases, markets provide complements to
traditional adjudicative processes, but in none of them does a market save
judges and juries the trouble of deciding cases and delivering verdicts.
29
24. For an overview of how capital markets process information, see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549 (1984).
25. See Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 12 YALE J.
ON REG. 435 (1995) (arguing that tort victims and others should be allowed to buy and sell tort claims to
create a secondary market in such claims).
26. See Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE L.J.
367 (1994) (urging that mass tort judgments be distributed among present and future claimants through a
market mechanism).
27. See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1983) (arguing that the best way of valuing a bankrupt firm is for an underwriter
to sell a percentage of its shares); see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New
World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 465 (evaluating different market-based approaches to
bankruptcy).
28. See Robin Hanson, Idea Futures: Encouraging an Honest Consensus (visited Feb. 19, 1997)
<http://www.lucifer.com/-sean/IF/Exi8-IF.html> (arguing for the creation of a market in which
scientists could invest in and trade claims that would ultimately be judged true or false); see also ROBIN
HANSON, COULD GAMBLING SAVE SCIENCE? ENCOURAGING AN HONEST CONSENSUS (8th Int'l Conf. on
Risk and Gambling 1990) (same); Robin Hanson, How Making Wagers on the Future Can Make It
Happen Faster, WIRED, Sept. 1995, at 125 (same). An Internet web site has implemented Hanson's
vision. See The Foresight Exchange (last visited Mar. 24, 1998) <http://www.ideosphere.com/fx/
main.htnl>. Alas, because of concerns about securities regulations, the site uses play cyber-money.
29. Mr. Choharis's proposal would allow tort victims to receive payment faster and would
encourage claim settlement. See Choharis, supra note 25, at 444-45. The courts, however, would
adjudicate claims that did not settle, and "victims will retain the right to proceed as they would under the
current system." Id. at 445. By contrast, my logic implies that a tort market could conceivably supplant
the courts in most cases by placing a value on each victim's claims.
Smith's scheme provides a means of balancing the interests of present and future victims of mass
torts when the tortfeasor will be unable to pay all claims. See generally Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997) (addressing rights of future claimants in the context of certification
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23). A court would invest a judgment against the tortfeasor in
government bonds, see Smith, supra note 26, at 401, and after enough time has passed for all victims to
be identified, it would distribute the proceeds pro rata to holders of "trust shares." A victim would
receive trust shares with face value equal to the injury whenever a court adjudicated that an injury had
occurred. The victim could sell the shares on the open market, and market participants would value the
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If legal claims can be exchanged in capital markets,3 ° then the prices at
which such claims are traded serve as predictors of the expected value of
judgments. Assuming that the capital markets in which legal claims trade are
efficient, traders will base their purchasing decisions on the facts and law of
particular cases, so that a strong legal claim will trade for more than a weak
one.31 As long as traders believe that a particular legal claim will be resolved
in court, then the price at which the claim has been traded could be used to
enter a judgment, saving the government the trouble of using the court at all.
Moreover, there is no reason that an entire legal claim needs to be traded for
this mechanism to function; the government could establish a market in
portions of legal claims. Traders would purchase at auction the rights to shares
in a small percentage of each legal claim. The legal claimant (the government
itself in the case of administrative enforcement actions) would receive the
auction proceeds and retain rights to the rest of the claim. The value of this
remainder would be determined not by judges or juries, but by the price at
which traders exchange the portion of the claim initially auctioned.
There is, of course, a complication, easily seen in a sentence from the
previous paragraph: "As long as traders believe that a particular legal claim
will be resolved in court, then the price at which the claim has been traded
could be used to enter a judgment, saving the government the trouble of using
the court at all." If the government does not ultimately use courts to resolve
cases, then traders no longer have any reason to believe that claims will be
resolved in court. Their incentive to value legal claims accurately thus
disappears. Traders, of course, are not easily tricked. The challenge, then, is to
give traders incentives to act as if all claims will ultimately be adjudicated
without actually adjudicating all claims. How might this be done?
shares based on market perceptions of how many victims would receive trust shares in the future. My
approach, in contrast, suggests that courts need not be used to award trust shares in all cases.
In Roe's market solution to bankruptcy, the court oversees the underwriting of a portion of the
bankrupt corporation's shares to determine a valuation for the firm that the judge can then use to make
decisions in subsequent proceedings. See Roe, supra note 27, at 559-60. An alternative market approach,
analogous to my hypothetical supplanting administrative market, would be for markets to substitute for
courts in judging individual disputes among bankrupt corporations and their creditors.
Even the high-tech idea futures market relies on judges ultimately to determine whether claims
have come true. Many claims on the Foresight Exchange, however, cannot be judged for many years,
and yet trading continues. That market participants appear to take long-term claims seriously even
though they are unlikely to care about their play money investments by the time claims are actually
judged suggests that adjudication may not be the primary constraint on prices of idea futures.
30. See generally Ari Dobner, Comment, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1529 (1996).
31. Cf. A.C. Pritchard, Auctioning Justice: Legal and Market Mechanisms for Allocating
Criminal Appellate Counsel, 34 AM. CaiM. L. REv. 1161, 1174-75 (1997) (arguing for the auctioning
off of rights to serve as government-paid contingent fee appellate counsel, and noting that clients with
the best legal claims would be most likely to benefit); id. at 1162 ("The market, therefore, would allocate
the largest share of legal resources to those criminal defendants with the most meritorious claims.").
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The following mechanism would provide one means of giving traders
appropriate incentives: Courts (or an institution like them) would be used to
resolve a small percentage of claims selected at random. For that small subset
of cases, the government would use the results of the traditional adjudication
to fine traders enough for overvaluing securities (or give them bonuses for
undervaluing them) to ensure that risk-averse traders would always act ex ante
as if all cases would be adjudicated. This is not the only possible mechanism
of disciplining traders' pricing.32 For present purposes, though, the
penalty/bonus mechanism, which produces a version of what I will call an
"administrative market," will be sufficient to show how the information-
processing capabilities of capital markets can simulate the outcomes of legal
proceedings.
I will explore how administrative markets can address the various scarcity
problems described above in the context of levying fines on companies
engaged in specified activities. For example, the administrative market could
be used to discourage pollution, to deter government contracting fraud, to fine
corporations whose workplaces are unsafe, to penalize corporations hiring
illegal aliens, or to provide incentives against misleading advertising of
consumer goods. The government would start the market for a particular
period by auctioning off "administrative market securities ' 33 corresponding to
each corporation possibly subject to a particular fine. The government would
deem each security to be worth a percentage of the amount by which the
corporation had underpaid the fine. After a specified period, the government
would calculate the value at which market participants were trading the
securities, and it would redeem the securities at this value. Then, the
corporation would be liable to the government for the fine corresponding to
the value of the securities.
My argument is structured as follows: Each part sketches a more powerful
vision of the administrative market than its predecessor, as I gradually build a
full-fledged administrative market and then apply it. This organization
emphasizes how progressively more developed versions of the administrative
32. In future work, I plan to sketch out a separate mechanism that does not rely on courts at all.
See Michael Abramowicz, Trial by Market (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
33. By using the word "security," I do not necessarily mean to imply that administrative market
securities would be deemed securities for all purposes of the federal securities laws. See generally 15
U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (1994) (defining a "security"); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686
(1985) (noting that labels applied to instruments by their issuers do not determine the reach of the
federal securities laws) (citing United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975)); 1
Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIEs REGULATION § 3A.1 (3d ed. 1989 & Ann. Supp. 1996);
Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, What Is a Security Under the Federal Securities Laws?, 56
ALB. L. REv. 473 (1993); Philip F. Franklin, Note, Definition of a Security: Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 40 Sw. L.J. 879 (1986).
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market increasingly accomplish the tasks that administrative agencies
currently perform."
Part I introduces the administrative market as a supplement to a traditional
administrative fine assessment apparatus, in which the enforcement agency
can sue individual corporations that refuse to concede the agency's
assessments of their fine liability. This part discusses some key benefits of
administrative markets: harnessing private information, encouraging
disclosure, and promoting settlement of administrative agency claims.
Part II introduces the "partially supplanting administrative market," which
takes advantage of the penalty/bonus mechanism to adjudicate claims in the
market. This part explains how variations on this mechanism could provide
incentives for traders to value securities accurately without imposing
burdensome risks on the traders. It also briefly considers four important
objections to administrative markets: that they might be inefficient or
uncompetitive and thus inaccurate; that they would represent compromises
unfair to the party that would have fared better under traditional adjudication;
that they would be jurisprudentially unsatisfactory; and that they would deny
adequate process to litigants.
Part III illustrates how the adjudication of claims in administrative
markets could change the incentives of regulators. This part explains how
administrative markets, unlike courts, can process general legal standards as
easily as detailed rules. An administrative market effectively adjudicates all
cases, eliminating the strategic bargaining that in traditional adjudication
under general legal standards can derail the settlement process. In addition,
while judges and courts typically make binary decisions when confronted with
legal standards, traders would evaluate corporate compliance along a
continuum. The possibility of creating administrative markets driven entirely
by general standards could empower policymakers to intervene efficiently in
areas where detailed regulation is impractical. Part III concludes by applying
this logic to show how an administrative market could smooth legal
transitions and thus make legal change more feasible.
Part IV briefly compares administrative markets with existing market-
oriented regulatory tools and provides some preliminary theoretical
assessment of the choice between administrative markets and these more
conventional approaches. In some cases, traditional market incentives are
likely to be superior to administrative markets, because such regulatory
regimes directly affect the incentives of actors in primary markets.
34. "Modem administrative agencies perform functions characteristic of all three branches of the
federal government. That is, a single agency often adjudicates individual cases, formulates rules having
the effect of law, and performs such executive functions as prosecuting actions in court and
investigating." GLEN 0. ROBINSON ET AL., THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 35 (4th ed. 1993). The full-
fledged administrative market either performs or provides a substitute for each of these functions.
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Administrative markets, however, may be more flexible than traditional
market incentives and are particularly useful where agencies face massive
enforcement problems.
I. Harnessing Private Information: The Supplemental Administrative Market
This part introduces the supplemental administrative market. By
"supplemental," I mean that the administrative market would operate in
tandem with existing legal mechanisms by which agencies collect corporate
fines. Agency attorneys would continue to pursue corporations who have
underpaid their fine liability and either seek settlements with those
corporations or ultimately resolve disputes with them in court. The
supplemental market, then, does not relieve agency attorneys or administrative
law judges of their duties. It does, however, provide a substitute for agency
investigators; the goal of the supplemental market is to help the government
harness private information relevant to assessing individual corporations' fine
liabilities and to encourage private actors to invest resources in finding such
information.
The supplemental administrative market could be used in conjunction
with any type of fine levied against corporations where third parties may have
information useful to agency attorneys or be able to obtain it. For example, the
Environmental Protection Agency might impose a fine to discourage emission
of a certain chemical and use an administrative market to help determine
which corporations have emitted the chemical and how much of it they have
emitted.35 Or, the government might replace its current elaborate scheme for
preventing government contracting fraud36 with a market-based approach that
would give private individuals incentives to determine whether a company
was overbilling the government.
Of course, the usefulness of such markets depends on the desirability of
harnessing private information. If it is not normatively desirable to give
private individuals incentives to investigate whether corporations are hiring
illegal aliens, then the government should not create an administrative market
35. The Environmental Protection Agency has faced criticism for inadequately identifying and
pursuing environmental offenders. See, e.g., GENERAL AccT. OFFICE, WASTEWATER DISCHARGERS ARE
NOT COMPLYING WITH EPA POLLUTION CONTROL PERMITS 7 (1983) (reporting that only about 18
percent of relevant companies were in full compliance with agency requirements); William L. Andreen,
Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional Prescription for Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the
Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 202 (1987). But see EPA Set Record in '96 of262 Criminal
Cases on Pollution Charges, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1997, at B5.
36. While the Justice Department and other administrative agencies, like the Defense Contracting
Audit Agency, are primarily responsible for preventing fraud, the government has turned to
whistleblower (or qui tam) suits as a way of giving individuals a role in ensuring compliance. See, e.g.,
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. § 3730 (1994)) (increasing qui tam penalties for civil fraud).
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to stimulate collection of such fines. My analysis does not consider the
difficult question of desirability, but simply assumes that the harnessing of
private information is beneficial in the context in which the administrative
market is being used.
Section L.A describes the mechanism that undergirds .the supplemental
market and explores the incentives that this mechanism will give to traders.
Section I.B describes the incentives it gives to other parties, particularly the
government and the corporations whose fine liability the market is predicting.
A. How the Supplemental Market Works
A supplemental administrative market is simply a capital market in which
traders buy and sell rights to portions of legal claims that the government has
against regulated entities. After a corporation has had an opportunity to pay
any fees it believes that it owes, the relevant administrative agency would tell
market participants how much the corporation paid. To launch the market, the
agency would auction off a certain number of "administrative market
securities" corresponding to each corporation possibly subject to a fine. For
example, the agency might promise that an administrative market security will
be worth 0.1% of any judgment the government ultimately obtains against a
corporation, and there might be 100 such securities auctioned.
After the auction, the agency would allow market participants to exploit
any private information they obtain by buying the securities and then
revealing the information. When the agency finally reaches a settlement with a
corporation or obtains a judgment in an administrative or other court, the
agency redeems the securities; the total redemption amount equals the product
of the originally unpaid fine liability and some "reward percentage," 10% in
the above example (0.1% times 100). By "unpaid fine liability," I mean the
difference between what the corporation initially paid and what it is finally
deemed to owe. The market is thus used merely to estimate the amouni by
which the corporation has underpaid.37
The market would encourage private parties to obtain and release
information about corporate liability. For example, suppose someone learns
37. Some might argue that corporations should not be able to pay any portion of what they owe
in advance. A danger of the market may be that it routinizes corporations' payment of money and thus
eliminates the stigma associated with fines. See, e.g., Michael J. Sandel, It's Immoral to Buy the Right to
Pollute, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at A23 ("If a company or a country is fined for spewing excessive
pollutants into the air, the community conveys its judgment that the polluter has done something wrong.
A fee, on the other hand, makes pollution just another cost of doing business, like wages, benefits and
rent."). Of course, I generally use the word "fine" rather than "fee," and have thus chosen a word that
would impose a stigmatic injury regardless of whether the money were paid in advance or after market
detection. In any case, the market would work just as effectively if corporations were not allowed to




that the market has underestimated a corporation's liability. She can buy the
corporation's administrative market securities at their current, low price. Then,
she can make a profit by revealing the information and selling the securities to
other traders, who are now willing to pay a higher price. Her incentive is to
trade on any information that she obtains as quickly as possible, lest someone
else acquire the same information and reveal it before she can do so.
Establishing such a market would thus serve as an alternative to qui tam
or whistleblower suits. The whistleblower mechanism analogously encourages
private parties to accumulate information and then to bring suit against those
parties.3" An advantage of the supplemental administrative market is that, in
contrast to qui tam litigation,39 it provides no way for private individuals to
profiteer off public information. This is because any public information will
be incorporated into the price of securities at the government's initial
auction.4"
There is, however, a separate justification for qui tam suits: Private
attorneys general may be more efficient litigators than the government. 41 If
this were true, however, the government could obtain the benefits of both
mechanisms by establishing a supplemental market whose result would
depend on the outcome of any qui tam litigation that occurs. That is, the
government would run the supplemental market and then, after trading on the
market closed, allow private parties to bring qui tam suits. Indeed, the
government could even estimate the litigation cost it would incur for suits it
would bring and then auction off rights of action using these calculations as a
floor; this would ensure that the most efficient litigator would prosecute qui
tam suits.
Assuming the reward from the administrative market was comparable to
the profit that could be obtained in a qui tam suit, investigators would have
incentives to trade on information in the supplemental market, to prevent
anyone else from profiting on the information.42 The point of this section is
38. See sources cited supra note 16.
39. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 16, at 222 ("[A] recurring pattern is evident under which the
private attorney general simply piggybacks on the efforts of public agencies ... in order to reap the
gains from the investigative work undertaken by these agencies."). Where a qui tam suit under the False
Claims Act relies on exclusively public information, the Department of Justice may seek to have the
claim dismissed. See Kovacic, supra note 16, at 1818 (noting that reliance on publicly available
information is one of a few reasons that the Department of Justice will seek dismissal of claim).
40. See infra Subsection I.A.1.
41. Indeed, there may be a stronger case for providing incentives for private parties to litigate
cases than for providing information-releasing incentives. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 16, at 224-25
("[I]t of en may be more efficient for public agencies to concentrate on detection (an area where they
have the comparative advantage because of their superior investigative resources) and leave the actual
litigation of the case to private enforcers, who are frequently more experienced in litigation tactics.").
42. A caveat is that an investigator might first buy up all the shares in the supplemental market,
not release information, and then try to profit on that information by buying the rights to the qui tam suit
Yale Journal on Regulation
that qui tam suits are not needed to create optimal incentives for the
production and release of private information. Administrative markets can
also provide such incentives, and so there is no need to confound an efficiency
evaluation of private prosecution and an 'assessment of supplemental
administrative markets.
For analytic simplicity, the following subsections thus assume a regime of
governmental prosecution in describing the supplemental administrative
market. Subsection I.A.1 explains how the reward percentage ultimately
controls total investment in the market. Subsection I.A.2 discusses how traders
can profit by showing that the market has underestimated a corporation's
liability. This subsection assumes that traders never attempt to profit by
showing that the market has overestimated a corporation's liability, an
assumption that Subsection I.A.3 relaxes.
In addition to providing concrete examples of traders' incentives, each of
these subsections illustrates two key points. First, if traders cannot fully profit
on their information by buying up all existing securities (or selling short the
same number), the government can compensate by raising the reward
percentage without losing money. Second, the government rewards the
provision of information in the market by receiving less in auction revenues
than it pays out when the market closes.
1. Investing in the Market
The reward percentage determines the amount of money at which
securities will be redeemed and thus directly affects the amount that bidders
will be willing to pay for securities at the initial auction. For example, if the
reward percentage were 25% and the rights against a particular corporation
were divided into 100 securities, then each security would ultimately be
redeemed at 0.25% of the corporation's total fine liability. So, if the
corporation eventually settled with the government for $100,000, the
securities in total would be worth $25,000, and each individual security would
be worth $250.
Of course, if it were entirely clear before the auction that the corporation
would ultimately pay the government this amount of money, the government
would reap in auction revenues the same $25,000 that it would pay out in
redeeming the securities. Thus, the government pays for private information
for a low price at auction. This strategy, however, would likely be ineffective. The investigator's refusal
to sell securities at prices higher than the price initially offered would lead others to suspect that the
investigator had inside information and thus attempt to outbid the investigator at the qui tam auction. An
artificial remedy to prevent such behavior would be to exclude any evidence that an investigator
obtained but did not release before the close of the supplemental market. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)
(providing for the exclusion of evidence requested during a discovery request but withheld).
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only when the initial auction revenues are less than the ultimate auction
payout. The total reward to the market will be equal to the reward percentage
multiplied by the portion of the unpaid fine liability for all corporations that
the government obtains above the level the market originally predicted. The
government thus can set the reward percentage to a level that balances the
need for investigative activity with its cost.43 If investigators expect to receive
25% of any increase in liability attributable to information they obtain, then
they will invest in uncovering information until they project that the cost of
obtaining a marginal bit of information will lead to the collection of an unpaid
fine four times as great." Assuming that investigators' expectations are on
average accurate, the total amount of investment in the market would be equal
to 25% of the ultimate increase in liability.45
In setting the reward percentage, the government must consider how
many cents it makes sense to spend to recover one dollar of fine liability that
the government otherwise would not recover." For example, the government
43. This does not necessarily exclude the possibility that the optimal reward percentage is zero.
This might be the case if the administrative agency is already so good at investigation that it does not
need any private help, or if market inefficiencies would make the administrative market ineffective.
44. If the administrative agency releases information about ongoing investigations, then it can
prevent private parties from profiting on this investigative work by buying and selling securities before
and after revealing information. The administrative agency's incentives to buy and sell securities may
differ from those of private investigators, however, because the administrative agency will ultimately
keep all but the reward portion of any recovery.
45. The supply of investigating firms will adjust to ensure an equilibrium. If the total investment
in the market were less than 25% of the liability increase, firms would have an incentive to enter until
economic profit fell to zero. If the total investment were greater than 25%, firms would earn negative
economic profit, and firms would thus leave the industry until economic profit rose to zero. This stems
from the conventional economic assumption that firms earn zero economic profit in the market. See, e.g.,
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 108 n.99 (1989) ("Economic profits are the residual earnings after all implicit
and opportunity costs are accounted for.").
46. The reward percentage helps to overcome a problem first identified by William Landes and
Richard Posner. They worried about the possibility that private enforcement of law might lead to
overenforcement. Their argument is well explained by A. Mitchell Polinsky:
Under public enforcement, if the probability of enforcement is unity, the fine should be set
equal to the external damage caused by the activity. By raising the fine and lowering the
probability, the same level of deterrence can be achieved at less cost. Under private
enforcement, however, they argued that raising the fine would lead to a higher probability
since profit-maximizing enforcers would be induced to invest more in enforcement. From
this they concluded that there would be private overenforcement.
A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 106 (1980)
(discussing Landes & Posner, supra note 16). Analogously, with the supplemental administrative
market, a reward percentage of 100% (with fines calculated at exactly the cost of activities being
regulated, adjusted by the probability of detection) might lead to overenforcement, because it might be
cheaper to investigate only half as many companies and double the relevant fines. As Polinsky notes,
however, "Regulating private enforcers by paying them something different [from] the fine for each
violator detected can achieve the socially most preferred outcome in the competitive case .... " Id. at
108 (emphasis omitted). The reward percentage does just that, paying investigators only a portion of the
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might determine that it makes sense to spend a quarter to recover an unpaid
dollar, but no more. While the quarter is a lost transactions cost, the dollar is
merely an income transfer.17 A quarter might seem high, but it is important to
keep in mind that this would not result in administrative expenses one-fourth
as great as total fees collected; when the market expects the government to
recover against a particular corporation, that expectation will increase the
government's auction revenues.
Assuming that a quarter were the optimal amount of social resources to
expend in recovering an unpaid dollar provides a starting point of 25% for
determining the reward percentage. From this starting point, the government
would need to subtract to take into account costs incurred by parties other than
the investigator on account of the investigator's activities. 48 More importantly,
the government would then need to increase the reward percentage above this
level, because attempts to trade on private information would change the price
of securities and thus prevent an investigator from receiving the full reward-
percentage-adjusted value of information provided to the market. The next
subsection elaborates on this problem in more detail.
fines they collect. Thus, if there is too much investigation for any level of fines, the reward percentage
can be lowered so that there is no overenforcement.
47. See generally Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward
to Inventive Activity, 61 Am. ECON. REV. 561 (1977). Hirshleifer notes that the private value of
information may exceed its social value. See also JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 151 (1992)
("From an individual's perspective, the value of new information, and hence of investing in generating
it, derives from technology, gains from allocating resources more efficiently, and distribution, wealth
transfers that follow from price change."). The reward percentage described here provides a way for the
government to discount the reward from obtaining information and thus align individuals' incentives to
obtain information with the social interest. Information about unpaid fees may have both distributional
and technological benefits from a social perspective. The distributional benefit exists because it is
(presumably) fair for a corporation to pay the fees assessed on it. The technological benefit exists
because if certain companies could get away with not paying fees, more of society's resources would
flow to those companies, thus diminishing allocational efficiency. There is no way to calculate the sum
of these benefits a priori. Indeed, it would be theoretically possible that the benefits would exceed a
dollar (for example, if the government viewed the distributional goal as particularly important).
Nonetheless, we should expect that, in general, the government will want to spend somewhat less than a
dollar to recover a dollar in unpaid fine liability.
48. In setting the reward percentage, the government would need to consider the expected costs
incurred by the corporation and by the courts. A 15% reward might reflect an expectation that costs not
incurred by the investigator would add up to 10% of the expected recovery. In other words, the
government might offer 15% rewards if it believed in this example that the social welfare benefits from
collecting unpaid fees would generally be worth 25% of the collected amount. This would mean that it
would be in the social interest for the government successfully to pursue a $100 fine deficiency when the
total social costs of the pursuit were $24, but not when these costs were $26. Because they can thus be
easily accounted for, costs not incurred by the investigator are not problematic for my analysis and will
not be considered further.
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2. Profiting on Undervaluation of Securities
To see how traders can make money by showing that the market has
undervalued a particular corporation's fine liability, consider the following
example: Suppose that when the government first holds an auction,
information that the government has released indicates that the expected
recovery against a specific corporation will be $50,000. If the government
auctions off 100 securities corresponding to this corporation49 and promises a
reward percentage of 25%, then market participants will buy the securities at
close to $125 each. Now, suppose an investigator uncovers information
indicating that the expected recovery will actually be $100,000. The
investigator buys up all the securities, releases the information publicly, and
then sells each security at $250. If the investigator is able to buy each security
at $125, the investigator has thus profited $12,500, which is equal to the
product of the reward percentage and the change in expected recovery.
Of course, investigators will often be unable to buy up all the securities at
their current price. After all, attempts to execute large volume transactions
would lead to suspicion that the investigator has some relevant information."
Such suspicion would be more prominent in the supplemental administrative
market, which encourages insider trading, than in other capital markets, which
criminalize it. Thus, security holders will demand more to sell a security than
their prior expected value of that security. To the extent this is true, however,
the government can compensate by increasing the reward percentage.
Suppose, for example, that the government would choose a reward
percentage of 25% if large volume purchases of securities never had an effect
on price. Let us call this the ideal reward percentage and the imagined world
in which trading had no effect on prices the ideal trading conditions. In this
world, security holders are foolish. They do not realize that when someone
seeks to buy their securities, this person might have information indicating
that the securities are undervalued. Thus, they will sell the securities at the
price corresponding to existing public information and not take into account
49. The number of shares is arbitrary, because the sum of the shares' values will be equal to the
reward. In considering how many shares to offer, the government would balance the transactions costs of
issuing additional shares with the benefits of making available shares in small denominations. Cf James
J. Hanks, Jr. & David F. Hannan, Dividing and Combining Stock: Stock Splits, Reverse Stock Splits, and
Stock Dividends, INSIGHTS, July 1996, at 2 (discussing the purposes and effects of stock splits).
50. See, e.g., Lewis D. Solomon & Louise Corso, The Impact of Technology on the Trading of
Securities: The Emerging Global Market and the Implications for Regulation, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
299, 319 & n.137 (1991) (noting that with non-liquid securities, large transactions cause substantial
changes in price). But see William J. Camey, Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CAT. U.
L. REV. 863, 886-88 (1987) (arguing that volume buying may not have a significant effect on the
security price); Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value,
and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1278 (1990) ("[I]n the absence of price pressure there is no
reason for an insider's transactions to move prices significantly.").
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that in some cases new information will arise indicating that the securities are
undervalued. Such traders might be better off holding onto their securities,
because any information traders would develop might ultimately be revealed
to the market, but they sell their securities anyway. To be sure, this is not a
realistic world.
Suppose, therefore, that because volume trading increases ihe prices of
securities, security traders are consistently able to make only one-third as
much off their information as they would be able to make if volume
transactions had no price effects. In this more plausible world, someone who
acquires information about undervaluation might initially be able to purchase
securities at a level not too far above the securities' expected value. But as this
trader attempts to buy more and more securities, suspicion increases. The
trader thus may be unable to acquire some securities and be able to acquire
many others only at a substantial premium over the prior price. Different
security holders would thus make out differently; some would obtain all of the
value of a trader's information by not selling at all, while others would obtain
only a small premium. The assumption is that, although security holders are
affected differently, the trader who has found new information is able to
obtain one-third of the value of the resulting price increase.
By tripling the reward percentage to 75%, the government could
encourage just as much investigation as in the ideal world. Moreover, this
compensating increase in the reward percentage would have no effect on the
total amount of money that the government has to pay to reward information
acquisition, relative to the world without price effects firom volume
transactions. To understand how this can be, recall that bidders at the initial
auction pay an amount equal to the expected value that they anticipate
receiving for the securities, less some amount to compensate for the risk of
holding them. If security holders expect that those developing new
information will be able to obtain one-third of the value of that information,
the security holders will expect that they will be able to keep on average two-
thirds. They will thus be willing to pay more for the securities initially in
anticipation of being able to keep two-thirds of the value of others' labor.
Thus, auction participants will bid enough extra to compensate the
government for the needed increase in the reward percentage.
Let us consider a specific numeric example, which Table 1 summarizes.
Suppose that existing public information indicates that a corporation owes just
$100,000, but auction bidders expect that there is a one-tenth chance that
evidence will surface indicating that the corporation in fact owes $200,000.
First, let us assume ideal trading conditions (middle column). With the ideal
25% reward percentage (Row (4)), the reward payment if new information
surfaces will be $50,000 (Row (6)), and $25,000 otherwise (Row (7)).
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Given the ideal trading conditions, the security holders are foolish, so they
will be willing to part with the securities for $25,000 (Row (8)), even if the
person attempting to buy them appears to be trying to comer the market.
Recognizing that they will thus receive $25,000 regardless of whether
information surfaces, auction bidders will be willing to pay $25,000 for the
securities (less some amount to compensate for the risk of holding them). This
will produce auction revenues of $25,000 (Row (9)). The government,
meanwhile, will end up paying out $27,500 on average (Row (10)), for an
expected cost to the government of $2500 (Row (11)).
If the reward percentage increases to 75% in the world in which
investigators generally obtain only one-third the value of their information
(right column, Rows (4)-(5)), the government will pay $150,000 when new
information arises (Row (6)) and $75,000 the rest of the time (Row (7)).
Security holders will expect that one-tenth of the time, they will receive an
average of $125,500 (two-thirds of the way between $75,000 and $150,000)
(Row (8)), though some will do better than this and some will do worse.
Auction bidders thus will now bid $80,000 in all (again less compensation for
risk) (Row (9)). Because the government's expected payout is now $82,500
(Row (10)), the government once again can expect to spend $2500 (Row
(11)).'
The $2500 the government ultimately expects to spend may seem like a
large amount. The difference between auction revenues and ultimate payouts,
however, is effectively the mechanism by which the government rewards the
market. The market's expectation is that there is a one-tenth chance that the
corporations' securities will rise in value from $100,000 to $200,000. Thus,
the expected increase in the securities' value is one-tenth of the difference, or
$10,000, and 25% of this increase is $2500.
This does not, of course, mean that the government will spend $2500 each
time in such a situation. If it turns out that the corporation did owe $200,000,
the government would end up spending, under ideal trading conditions,
$25,000 (the $50,000 ultimate payout less $25,000 in initial auction receipts),
while the other nine-tenths of the time, the government will spend nothing.
And under nonideal trading conditions, the government would end up,
51. This does not mean that the government should be indifferent between ideal trading
conditions and those in which traders can obtain on average only half the value of their information. The
problem is that even if traders obtain on average half the value of their information, they might
sometimes obtain more than that and sometimes obtain less. There is thus some additional increased risk
to acquiring information. Likewise, security holders will not be sure that they will be able to obtain
exactly half the value of traders' information every time. Though this will not increase the expected
returns from holding the securities, it will increase the variance in outcomes and thus the risk of holding
them. The government will pay for this risk in the form of lower auction revenues.
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$70,000 ($150,000 minus $80,000) one-tenth of the time, and would profit by
$5000 the remaining portion of the time.
TABLE 1
Trading on Information About Undervaluation (Assuming 100 Securities)
VARIABLE IDEAL TRADING NONIDEAL TRADING
CONDITIONS CONDITIONS
(1) EXPECTED LIABILITY $100,000 $100,000
BASED ON CURRENT PUBLIC
INFORMATION
(2) PROBABILITY OF NEW 0.10 0.10
INFORMATION'S ARISING
(3) EXPECTED LIABILITY IF $200,000 $200,000
NEW INFORMATION ARISES
(4) REWARD PERCENTAGE 0.25 0.75
(5) PROPORTION OF 0 2/3
INCREASE IN VALUE
SECURITY HOLDERS RETAIN
(6) REWARD PAYMENT $50,000 ($500 per $150,000 ($1500 per
WHEN NEW INFORMATION security) security)
ARISES = (3) x (4)
(7) REWARD PAYMENT $25,000 ($250 per $75,000 ($750 per
WHEN NO NEW security) security)
INFORMATION ARISES -
(1) x (4)
(8) AMOUNT AT WHICH $25,000 ($250 per $125,000 ($1250 per
SECURITY HOLDERS WILL security) security)
SELL SECURITY ON
AVERAGE WHEN NEW
INFORMATION ARISES = (7) +
(5) x [(6) - (7)]
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(9) AUCTION REVENUES $25,000 ($250 per $80,000 ($800 per
(IGNORING RISK) = (8) x (2) security) security)
+ (7) x [1.0 - (2)]
(10) EXPECTED $27,500 ($275 per $82,500 ($825 per
GOVERNMENT PAYOUT = security) security)
(6) x (2) + (7) x [1.0 - (2)]
(11) EXPECTED COST TO $2500 ($25 per $2500 ($25 per
GOVERNMENT = (10) - (9) security) security)
The important point is that over the long haul, the amount of money the
government ends up spending will be equal to the product of the reward
percentage and the increased corporate fees paid. And when traders expect to
be able to profit from other investigators' information, the government can
simply increase the reward percentage without additional cost. To do so, the
government would multiply the ideal reward percentage by the inverse of the
proportion of security value increases that an investigator will be able to
capture. Of course, determining this value is not easy, but the government
could arrive at a satisfactory value over time.
It might seem that there is a problem with this story, and indeed there is a
nuance I have set aside because it ultimately does not change the conclusion.
The problem can be seen most clearly by comparing Rows (9) and (10) in
Table 1. If the expected government payout is higher than the auction
revenues, doesn't a trader have an incentive to bid up the auction revenues to
just below the expected payout and hold onto the securities? Indeed, why is a
security holder willing to sell securities for the amount in Row (8)? Of
coursein the case of ideal trading conditions, the answer is that we have
posited irrational security holders. But even under nonideal trading conditions,
one might argue that it is unrealistic to assume that traders will obtain
anything less than all of the value of new information, because traders will not
have incentives to sell their securities under any circumstances.
The problem, it might seem, only gets worse. Why should people ever
trade securities after the initial auction? After all, the supplemental
administrative market, in contrast to a stock market, has no long term trend.
Thus, trading securities may seem like a zero sum game. Some traders will
make money, but their winnings will be offset exactly by other traders' losses.
Given that the trading industry's total expected profit will be zero dollars, no
one would intelligently go into the industry. Or, at least, for any firn
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intelligently entering the industry, there is another firm foolishly entering the
industry, and after suffering initial losses, that firm will exit.
There are three replies to this argument. First, the example I have used is
stylized to make the analysis simpler. In real cases, there will rarely be a one-
in-ten chance of a smoking gun that will lead to additional liability. Instead,
the amount a corporation owes will typically be approximately known, though
of course with some uncertainty. Investors will often want to engage in trades
because doing so will help them manage their portfolios. Moreover,
information over time will decrease the variance of securities' values, so the
value of securities will rise over time, even if not in expected. value terms.
Thus, security holders may well demand high premiums for securities
purchased at auction, but at some price less than the maximum conceivable
future security price, they (at least some of them) will be willing to sell. And
that is enough to validate the above analysis.
Second, and more significantly, the problem is a coordination problem
among security holders, but it is a coordination problem that can be easily
overcome. If one individual owns all the securities, the individual would have
an incentive to make a credible promise to sell the securities at a pre-specified
price.52 Otherwise, no one else would have any incentive to produce the
relevant information, and new information increasing the value of the
securities would never be produced. The optimal selling price ito promise will
be somewhere between the securities' value based on available public
information and the securities' maximum value if new information should
arise.53
52. One might argue that such a promise could not be credible, because there would be no
consideration and it would, therefore, be unenforceable. The promise would be an offer, but the security
holder might have an incentive to revoke the offer just before acceptance. This argument is weak,
however, given the doctrine of promissory estoppel. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1214 (6th ed.
1990) (defining "promissory estoppel" as "[t]hat which arises when there is a promise which promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on part
of promisee, and which does induce such action or forbearance, and such promise is binding if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement") (emphasis added). Here, the promise to sell the securities for
some price to the first taker induces traders to undertake investigative work, and the security holder in
fact intends this result. In any case, if the government were to set up a supplanting administrative
market, it could provide for the enforceability of such promises.
53. Consider the example of Table 1. If the security holder credibly promised a selling price of
$75,000, then he would receive none of the benefit of the new information and would be willing to bid
only $75,000 for the securities in the first place. Therefore, someone else would have an incentive to bid
more for the securities and credibly promise a higher selling price. On the other hand, if the security
holder credibly promised a selling price of $150,000, then no one would perform any investigation, and
the security holder would make nothing. Thus, the security holder will seek to find the amount in
between these two extremes. There is nothing to guarantee that the number selected will be $125,000, of
course. The point of the above analysis, however, is that whatever the security holder's optimization
calculus with selecting an optimal price offer, the government can raise the reward percentage enough to
produce conditions comparable to ideal trading conditions.
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When security holdings are diffuse, by contrast, any one security holder
will not have an incentive to offer such a promise. Because the securities are
thus likely to be most valuable if owned initially by a single owner, such an
owner is likely to win them at auction. That owner might subsequently sell the
securities to others, provided that all buyers agree to coordinate to determine a
joint, credible price at which they will sell their securities. Thus, the story is
different from that told above, but the conclusion is the same: Security holders
capture some percentage of the value of investigators' information not
because they sense an investigator trying to comer the market, but because
they have made ex ante promises to such investigators that prevent them from
capturing the entire value of the information.
Third, even if security holders had no incentives to sell their securities,
that does not mean that the mechanism I have described would not work at all.
It would still work, but all the action would be at the auction stage instead of
the market stage. That is, investigators would have incentives to do all their
investigative work prior to the beginning of the auction. This is not ideal,
because different auction bidders might have redundantly acquired the same
information. The government will pay for this redundancy by receiving lower
auction bids. 4 The market allows for more cooperative informational
production over time, but the auction provides additional insurance that the
mechanism I have described will give incentives to private parties to identify
circumstances in which corporations owe more than originally expected.
3. Profiting on Overvaluation of Securities
Thus far, it has been assumed that no trader would ever find information
that the market was overpricing a corporation's liability. This assumption is
relatively unproblematic, because a corporation would presumably release any
information favorable to it, but it can be easily relaxed.* To profit on
information about market overvaluation, 55 a market participant may sell
securities short.5 6 To continue the above example, suppose an investigator
54. See Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative
Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 423, 450-52 (1993) (noting the standard axiom of
auction theory that the auctioneer effectively pays all bidders' research costs).
55. Not all information suggests market undervaluation or market overvaluation; information
could provide affirmative evidence that a security is already priced correctly. Restricted to purchases and
short sales, the trader has no incentive to trade on and reveal such information immediately; instead, the
trader hopes that other evidence arises indicating that a security has been priced incorrectly before
trading on and revealing the information. A trader could, however, profit on such information with
option contracts. For a brief and accessible discussion of options contracts, see Bemard J. Karol, An
Overview of Derivatives As Risk Management Tools, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 195, 195-96 (1995).
56. A short sale is a promise to deliver a security that the seller does not own in the future at a
specified price. See, e.g., David C. Worley, The Regulation of Short Sales: The Long and Short of It, 55
BROOK. L. REv. 1255, 1257-59 (1990) (explaining the SEC's definition of short sale).
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uncovers new information indicating that the corporation really owed
$100,000 rather than $200,000. Before releasing the information, the
investigator executes short contracts, agreeing to sell the securities at a later
date.
Initially, assuming a 25% reward percentage, some traders will be willing
to enter into short contracts at some relatively small premium under $500, but
as the investigator executes more and more short contracts, this premium will
increase. The investigator will continue to execute short contracts as long as
there are traders willing to buy for $250 or more. After the investigator
releases the information, the market price plummets to $250. The investigator
buys up shares at this price57 and then sells them under the short contracts at
the agreed-to prices. The investigator thus earns as much as $25,000, the
product of the reward percentage and the amount by which securities were
overvalued.
This scenario may seem more speculative than the original. After all,
wouldn't security holders be particularly suspicious of someone offering to
sell them short contracts? Traders, however, would be no more suspicious of
someone offering to sell short contracts than they would be of someone
offering to purchase securities. Because the supplemental administrative
market has no natural long-term trend, predictions of fine liability are no more
likely to go up than to go down. Thus, market participants should be just as
willing (and existing security holders should be almost as willing)58 to go
short on a security as to go long on it.59
An important difference, though, is that security holders have no incentive
to encourage investigators to produce information about security
overvaluation by agreeing to buy securities in the future. They, after all, are
better off if information that the corporation's liability is being overestimated
never comes to light. The corporations whose securities are being traded,
57. A shareholder might ultimately refuse to sell at $250 to the holder of the short contract
because she knows that the short contract makes the investigator's demand for the share completely
inelastic. To compensate for this problem, the government should agree to sell shares when the market
closes at the redemption price. The short seller could thus buy the share from the government when the
market closes for $250, and sell it for $500 to the short buyer, who would then sell it back to the
government for $250.
58. The caveat is that because of diversification, a security holder who owns a security may be
less willing to buy another share of the same security at its expected value less an adjustment for
remaining risk than to sell the security owned at that same price. That is, entering into a short contract to
buy a security in the future will decrease slightly the diversification of the portfolio of one who already
owns the security. See Markowitz, supra note 22, passim. There is no reason, however, that investigators
who obtain information about market overvaluation can sell short only to current security holders; they
might also sell short to other traders.
59. More technically put, the bid-ask spread should be no higher for short contracts than for long




however, might similarly stimulate investigation. For example, a corporation
might credibly promise to buy securities from any market participant at the
prevailing market price.60 By making such a credible promise, the corporation
itself would be rewarding the acquisition of information that the market was
overvaluing its securities.6'
Allowing corporations to bind themselves to buying short contracts,
however, might encourage socially excessive searches for information about
security overvaluation. Regardless of the reward percentage, a corporation
achieves the full benefit of the decrease in liability it enjoys because of
information indicating that its securities were overvalued. Because the reward
percentage is designed to achieve some balance between transactions costs
and equity, a corporation that agrees, for example, to buy four times as many
short contracts as existing securities might encourage too much production of
information about security overvaluation from a social point of view.
Corporations would not necessarily make such exorbitant promises,
however. After all, investigators looking into a corporation's fine liability
hoping to find information about security overvaluation might instead find
information about undervaluation. Such an investigator would then have an
incentive to trade on that information, even if it were not as profitable as
information about overvaluation would have been. This would not necessarily
be a problem, though. Investigation into certain areas, such as legal defenses
that the corporation could offer, might not lead to much spillover.
In any event, ensuring that traders can profit from security overvaluation
is not integral to the market's success. Corporations have adequate incentives
already to provide evidence showing that the market has overestimated its fine
liability.62 The government thus might reasonably choose to ban short
60. The corporation would need to specify how many securities a trader could sell short to the
corporation. One logistical problem that such a rule would need to overcome is that it would need to
specify whether one trader's sale of short securities would preclude other traders from similarly selling
short to the corporation. There are two possible solutions. First, the corporation might provide that once
a certain number of securities are sold short to the corporation, no more shares could be sold short, but
the short contracts could themselves be exchanged. Second, and probably more attractively, the
corporation might provide that it could choose, once securities are sold short to it, whether to bind itself
to buying more securities short.
61. If a corporation did choose to so bind itself, then traders finding information about market
overvaluation would be able to obtain the full benefit of such information by forcing the corporation to
buy securities short. Traders would thus have a greater incentive to obtain such information than to
obtain information about undervaluation. One way to compensate for this is to limit the number of
securities that investigators can sell short to a corporation. For example, if the reward percentage is
tripled above the ideal level, investigators might be allowed to sell only one-third the number of
securities to a corporation. On the other hand, a corporation might be able to control ex ante how many
securities investigators may force it to buy short, and thus affect the extent to which it rewards
acquisition of information by third parties.
62. See infra Subsection I.B.2.
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transactions.63 I do not mean to suggest, however, that the government
necessarily should ban such transactions. Indeed, the argument that
corporations will spend too much to prove that the market has overestimated
its liability cuts both ways. If corporations will have incentives to spend
socially excessive amounts of money hiring their own investigators, why not
let them at least take advantage of the efficient mechanism that the market
offers?
This policy discussion, in any case, is a digression from the principal
point of this section-that the government can set the reward percentage to a
level that provides appropriate incentives for investigators without costing the
government extra money. For example, the government might require
corporations to enter into short contracts to buy in the future from any trader
one-third of all outstanding securities at the prevailing market price at any
time' and prevent corporations from entering into additional short contracts.
If the reward percentage were 75%, this would mean that investigators would
be able to obtain an effective reward percentage of 25% on information about
security overvaluation. Thus, if the government's goal is to simulate some
ideal reward percentage, it can do so by: (1) multiplying the reward
percentage by the inverse of the portion of security-value changes that traders
are able to capture for information about undervaluation; and (2) imposing a
requirement on corporations that they buy short the same fraction (i.e., the
portion of security-value changes traders capture) of outstanding securities. In
short, by controlling two variables-the reward percentage and the portion of
outstanding securities that a corporation must be willing to buy short-the
government can precisely control the amount of investigative activity that
occurs.
B. Incentives in the Administrative Market
This section assesses how the administrative market would change the
behavior of the administrative agency and of corporations subject to the
market. Subsection I.B. 1 shows that a byproduct of the market is that the
government could check market price to determine the market's expectation of
different corporations' fine liabilities. This information could help direct the
administrative agency's enforcement efforts. While security prices will reflect
only available information, corporations would have strong incentives to
provide information to markets. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts have
63. In an electronic market, the government could accomplish this by simply not providing a
mechanism for entering in short transactions. In a nonelectronic market, the government could simply
refuse to enforce short contracts. For a discussion of electronic markets, see Solomon & Corso, supra
note 50.
64. See supra note 61.
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demonstrated that interested parties have incentives to release information to
markets if failure to release such information would lead to market
punishment." Subsection I.B.2 incorporates this insight by noting that
corporations will want to ward off unwarranted prosecution by the
administrative agency and thus will try to submit information to lower their
security prices. Corporations whose securities are overvalued would have
incentives to submit to impartial audits and supply the results of such audits to
the market. Similar reasoning explains why malevolent traders will be unable
to wreak havoc by releasing false information about corporate underpayment.
Finally, Subsection I.B.3 notes that the objectivity of the market indicator will
provide corporations with a partial incentive to settle disputes at the market
price.
1. The Pricing Mechanism
If market transactions are public, then the administrative agency can use
market prices to help determine which corporations to target for further
investigation and prosecution. The value at which a security trades is a
function of the ultimate amount that market participants expect a corporation
to pay. This, in turn, depends on market information about the corporation and
predictions about how the administrative agency and the courts will respond
to information about factual and legal ambiguity.66 For example, if traders
disbelieved a company's claims that the release of a chemical was exempt
from a tax, the securities corresponding to that company's liability for
emission of that chemical would be relatively high in value. The
administrative agency would know to be suspicious of the company's position
without even checking any legal arguments that the traders offer in an effort to
increase the value of their shares. The market price in effect summarizes
65. See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Relying on the Information of Interested Parties, 17
RAND J. ECON. 18 (1986). Milgrom and Roberts write:
[E]ven if the parties do not have access to all information, or if they cannot report all that
they know, rational skepticism by a decisionmaker can lead to a full-information decision by
inducing one party to reveal information that is damaging to its interests. The party reveals
this information for fear that withholding it will lead to an even more unfavorable
supposition by the skeptical decisionmaker.
Id. at 30-31; cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1972
(1992) ("Revelation and assessment by sophisticated parties lead to astute inferences even when the
penalties for fraud are weak. This effect is especially powerful when the information is assessed
comparatively.").
66. For example, available information might indicate that there is a 50% chance that a
corporation has failed to pay a fine. At the same time, market participants might judge from available
legal evidence that assuming the corporation did not make the payment, 75% of courts would hold that
there was no requirement to do so. Assuming the market expects the administrative agency to prosecute
the case, the market price of the securities would reflect the prediction that there is a 12.5% chance that
the corporation has underpaid.
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information. If the market works effectively, then the administrative agency
might usefully rely on market prices in determining which corporations to
prosecute.
To some extent, market price will merely reinforce the administrative
agency's choice of whom to prosecute, but if the agency pays attention to the
market price, traders will be less concerned with assessing how the agency
would respond to different types of evidence. If the agency pursues all
corporations that the market judges to have underpaid, then security prices
will reflect traders' assessments of facts and law, as well as factual and legal
ambiguity and the courts' anticipated response to such ambiguity. '
2. Voluntary Auditing
Administrative agency reliance on market price will encourage
corporations to provide information to the market supporting their fine self-
assessments. If a corporation can convince the market that it has overvalued
the corporation's fine liability, then it not only avoids the hassle of
governmental pursuit, but also can make a profit by selling short the securities
corresponding to it. One way the corporation might try to move the market
price would be to provide information directly to the market."t Similarly, a
corporation might produce a legal brief to support its interpretation of the law.
Because traders might not find it cost-effective to analyze reams of evidence
and partisan legal assessments, however, a corporation might instead submit
to voluntary audit by an independent accountant or hire an independent legal
analyst. The market could process conclusory audit and legal infbrmation at a
low transactions cost.
By announcing in advance the intent to submit to such an audit and then
releasing the results, the corporation could assure the market that it has not
cherry-picked auditors. Auditors, meanwhile, would have an incentive to
67. Some indeterminacy may result, however, when the administrative agency relies on market
price, and market participants are predicting to some extent the market price itself. If the administrative
agency cannot pursue all corporations believed to have underpaid, then part of the market's challenge is
to predict what the agency will do, which depends in turn on how the market prices the securities. For a
statement of an analogous circularity problem, see Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1229-34
(1967), which discusses the problem of using "investment-backed expectations" to determine
compensation for takings. If, however, we assume that no single trader of securities has market power,
then security prices will not systematically affect which corporations the agency pursues. Nonetheless,
there is likely to be a drastic dropoff in security prices past the point at which the agency is expected to
be able to pursue delinquent corporations.
68. There are obvious analogies to current administrative practice. In the existing tax system, for
example, taxpayers may provide additional information to the IRS when they find out that the Service
questions their returns. See James E. Merritt, How to Handle a Tax Controversy at the IRS and in Court,
SC24 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 5, 11 (1997) (noting types of information usually given to IRS at audit).
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preserve their reputations by conducting honest audits.69 If an auditor did not
have a reputation for honesty, then the market would discount that auditor's
findings and corporations would look elsewhere. Similarly, the market will
place the most weight on the opinions of legal analysts who best predict how
the courts actually decide legal questions. Auditors and legal analysts might
even have incentives to subject their own operations to audit and random
double-checking by private organizations ranking the integrity of auditors.7"
This system is not perfect, as auditors might have an incentive to create a
reputation for honesty and then sell it at the end of their careers or to a
particularly large client. Market participants, however, would have incentives
to try to identify such sales.
Adverse selection will contribute to the incentives that corporations have
to submit to audits.7 The first corporations to submit will be those who know
that the market has overestimated their fine liabilities. If the market price
initially indicates that the market expects payment of additional fees and the
corporation fails to submit to an audit, the market price will rise further,
because traders will see this failure as partial confirmation of their original
suspicions.72 This phenomenon increases the incentive that innocent
corporations have to submit to audits.73 Similar dynamics will encourage those
69. Cf. Mindy Jaffe Smolevitz, Note, The Opinion Shopping Phenomenon: Corporate America's
Search for the Perfect Auditor, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 1077, 1104-05 (1987) (noting that shopping for
auditors currently occurs despite auditors' incentives to preserve reputations). The market's discounting
of unreliable audit opinions should improve auditors' incentives to deliver honest assessments.
Corporations would also have some incentive to be honest. See generally Joel Sobel, A Theory of
Credibility, 52 REV. ECON. STUD. 557 (1985).
70. Besides reputation, the primary control on auditors is the prospect of liability for fraud. See
generally Jan S. Blaising, Note, Are the Accountants Accountable? Auditor Liability in the Savings and
Loan Crisis, 25 IND. L. REV. 475 (1991).
71. "Adverse selection occurs when the expected accident costs of new entrants into an insurance
pool exceed those of the average pool member and therefore exceed the premium charged to all
members." Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation for
Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 23 (1991). Here, the "insurance pool" consists
of all those corporations who refuse auditing and thus are treated without regard to information that such
audits would produce. Because corporations who have the most to gain will exit the insurance pool, the
market is likely to be skeptical of those in it and thus charge them a high price for remaining.
72. Milgrom and Roberts develop this intuition in the context of their formal model. See
Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 65, at 28.
73. This does not necessarily mean that every corporation will submit to an audit, however, and
whether voluntary disclosure will work as well as mandatory disclosure is a difficult question. The
securities literature has debated whether voluntary transactions would provide an adequate substitute for
SEC mandatory disclosure requirements. Compare, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the
Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984) (arguing that mandatory
disclosure may move parties' incentives to release information toward the social optimum), with Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection ofInvestors, 70 VA. L.
REV. 669 (1984) (arguing that voluntary disclosure might be sufficient absent state shareholder
protection legislation). See generally Roger J. Dennis, Mandatory Disclosure Theory and Management
Projections: A Law and Economics Perspective, 46 MD. L. REV. 1197, 1205-11 (1986) (summarizing
the debate). Recent technological advances that allow easy information distribution over the Interet
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providing information that corporations have underpaid fees to present that
information to an independent auditor. The market will place the most faith in
evidence submitted by those with sound reputations for providing accurate
data. Making unsupported accusations without evidence is thus unlikely to be
profitable. In short, because those who resist auditing face adverse selection,
moral hazard problems are reduced.74
Auditing is costly, of course. A corporation that believes that an audit will
result in $50,000 of decreased fine liability will be willing to spend up to that
amount on an audit, even though this Cost might be excessive from a social
perspective.75 On the other hand, it may be cheaper for corporations to self-
audit than it is for the administrative agency to audit corporations. How the
balance tips is an empirical question, but self-auditing is likely to be an
improvement. Currently, corporations may be willing to pay $49,000 to hire
accountants to find technical ways of evading regulations to reduce fine
liability by $50,000. But this technique may not be as successful if market
traders rather than the government assess accountants' reports and discount
the reports of accountants known to stretch the rules.
While market pricing will be determined by many different traders'
assessments of information, the existence of auditors means that each trader
need not reinvent the wheel by scrutinizing all evidence. Moreover, traders
would be likely to defer partially to other traders and analysts with reputations
for pricing securities accurately.76 Just as analysts of particular companies
may make deregulation more palatable. See Stephen Choi, The Deregulation of Cyber-Securities
Markets (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation) (arguing that the
World Wide Web decreases transactions costs enough so that third-party services verifying voluntarily
released corporate data would provide adequate information to capital markets). Of course, if voluntary
disclosure is insufficient in the administrative market, the market could still be useful in a mandatory
disclosure regime.
74. Specifically, both corporations and information providers will have reduced incentives to
release false information when adverse selection pressures cause many other corporations and
information providers to submit to neutral audits. This conclusion is consistent with Rose's recent
observation that adverse selection and moral hazard are inversely related. See Carol M. Rose, The
Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2199 (1997) (noting the tension in the selection of
property or liability rules between the adverse selection problem of withholding infrirmation and the
moral hazard problem of failing to invest in resources).
75. One solution would be to have an additional administrative market to charge corporations for
socially excessive self-auditing. Cf. infra Subsection III.A.2 (discussing the possibility of creating an
administrative market to charge corporations for socially excessive tax avoidance).
76. Cf Coffee, supra note 73, at 723 (noting that, particularly as information distribution
becomes increasingly electronic, "the analyst seems likely to become the critical mechanism of market
efficiency"). Coffee notes that analyst services may be underprovided, because non-customers will free
ride off their research. See id. at 726 ("[T]he public goods-like character of securities research implies
that the analyst cannot obtain the full economic value of his discovery .... "). Coffee's other criticism is
that markets might encourage too much trading. See id. at 733 & n.45 (citing Hirshleifer, supra note 47).
This would not be a problem for the administrative market, in which the reward percentage provides
appropriate incentives for information accumulation. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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produce reports that help guide the stock market, so too would traders in the
supplemental administrative market have incentives to specialize.
3. Settlement Incentives
Once corporations have had time to submit to voluntary audits, market
prices will depend on public information, the results of audits, and the
openness that corporations have shown by agreeing to or refusing auditing.
Any corporation whose officers believe that the security's market price
reflects these factors has an incentive to settle with the administrative agency
for the amount corresponding to the security price if the corporation believes
the agency would otherwise prosecute the claim.77 Even a corporation whose
directors believe that the initial market price ignores some favorable evidence
might want to settle. They will consider the costs and benefits of conveying
information to the market through, for example, an audit. Assuming that
litigation is at least as expensive as voluntary auditing-a reasonable
assumption given that the corporation will have to present evidence to the
court-the corporation will want to settle with the administrative agency when
the private costs of obtaining an audit exceed the private benefits.7"
Some corporate directors may not trust the market. First, a director might
have private information that the market has not obtained. But if this were so,
he would have every incentive to release that information, make money by
trading on it, and ward off the administrative agency, unless it is cheaper to
settle. If, for example, the corporation had information that an auditor made an
error that the courts would recognize, the corporation would have incentives
to present this evidence to a second auditor.7 9 Second, a corporation might
simply believe that the market has mispriced the information about it. Such
claims would be particularly reasonable if the market's reward percentage
77. Suppose that after a corporation submits to an audit, the market prices its liability at
$100,000. If the administrative agency credibly threatens this corporation with litigation and its officers
think the market is right, then they would think that the average expected result of such litigation would
be $100,000 plus legal expenses. Even if legal expenses were zero, a risk averse corporation would
benefit by hedging risk and settling for $100,000, since the actual judgment might be higher or lower
than this amount. See, e.g., Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Pretrial Negotiations with Asymmetric
Information on Risk Preferences, 14 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 273, 279 (1994) (noting how risk aversion
increases a party's incentives to settle and decreases the party's success in negotiation).
78. Indeed, even in traditional litigation, corporations and others are often eager to settle. See,
e.g., Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the
Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REv. 77 (1997) (trying to explain the puzzle of high settlement by noting
that lawyers are likely to urge their clients to maximize wealth); George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving
Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 135 (1993) (estimating that
95% of civil suits settle prior to trial).
79. The corporation might simply want to hide the information to protect its secrets. But if court
proceedings are public record, then the corporation will also not want to present this favorable
information in litigation, and therefore will still want to settle.
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were very small and market participants had very little incentive to scrutinize
available evidence. This story is hard to believe, however, because, as I will
discuss later, the market could cheaply consider audit information.80 If the
market does price administrative market securities efficiently-or if it prices
them at least as accurately as a corporation could-then the corporation's
distrust in the market is misplaced. Over time, corporations might come to
trust the market more than themselves-or, at least, more than they trust their
accountants and lawyers-and might settle at the price the market indicates.
In sum, if the administrative agency offers to settle with corporations at
the market price and threatens to litigate against those corporations that refuse,
then corporations will have incentives to settle. As more corporations settle,
the administrative agency's threats to litigate become more credible, and other
corporations' incentives to settle increase further. The administrative agency
adopting such a strategy would thus be able to pursue a larger number of
corporations than is currently possible. Of course, some recalcitrant
corporations would still refuse to settle, at least until litigation seems
inevitable, because they will realize that the administrative agency does not
have the resources to pursue everyone. Moreover, the market price will take
into account the existence of such corporations, and the administrative agency
will not recover as much as if it fully prosecuted every case. Administrative
agencies, however, are too busy to accomplish such full prosecution. Capital
markets, though, are never too busy to take on some additional work.
II. Deciding Cases: The Partially Supplanting Administrative Market
Part I assumed that while the fine collection agency might rely on the
administrative market to guide its decision making, the agency's
administrative courts would continue to make independent assessments of
underlying factual and legal ambiguity. But if the market's assessments of
ambiguity are reliable, the legislature could economize by providing that a
corporation shall pay whatever fine the market says it owes."' The role of the
courts would then be limited to entering and enforcing judgments. In effect,
the partially supplanting market forces settlement at the market-determined
80. See infra text following note 103 (explaining why market processing of infarmation need not
be expensive).
81. The legislature might require only corporations whose securities' values: exceed some de
minimis threshold to pay anything at all. Because there is always some possibility that unknown facts
will indicate that a corporation has underpaid, all security values will be somewhat greater than zero.
(This would not be the case, however, if the market were also used to provide refunds for corporations
that overpaid.) To prevent corporations that have filed correctly from having to pay based on
ungrounded suspicions, the administrative agency could collect only when the market's estimation of
underpayment exceeds a percentage of the amount paid. This may be particularly appropriate if having
to pay fines induces corporate embarrassment.
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price."2 Such a change would thwart those corporations who refuse to settle
simply because they know that the administrative agency cannot pursue
everyone. The partially supplanting administrative market adjudicates all
claims and thus serves to alleviate the problem of process scarcity.
The mechanism proposed here thus provides an improvement upon recent
proposals for "statistical adjudication," in which only a few cases are selected
for adjudication and the remainder are decided purely via statistical tools like
regression analyses.83 While such adjudication may be a viable solution to the
problem of process scarcity, 4 its primary defect is that the cases not selected
for actual adjudication are resolved based on their alleged similarity to cases
that are tried, even though each case may present unique factual issues,
including unique credibility and evidentiary determinations.85 The partially
supplanting administrative market would give traders incentives to identify
such unique features. Thus, justice would still be individualized, with the size
of the reward percentage determining the amount of individualization, but
without the expense of adjudicating every case in court.
This part considers various objections to the supplanting administrative
market, including concerns that the market might be inaccurate or in some
other way unjust. Before this part can consider these objections directly, it
must address a vital related question: What determines the market-clearing
price? After all, if the agency will repurchase securities when the market
closes at the value at which the securities have been trading, no set of
anticipated future cash flows disciplines trading. That is, if traders exchange a
certain security at $50, then that security will be worth $50, while if traders
exchange a security at $100, then that security will be worth $100. For the
market to work, the system must make traders act as if every case is still being
adjudicated in the traditional manner, as in the supplemental administrative
market of Part I. This part begins by proposing a mechanism that leads traders
to act as if every case will be adjudicated as usual, even though in fact only a
small percentage of cases will be.
82. Many potential litigants would find this to be a relief. See, e.g., David Luban, Settlements and
the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2621 (1995) ("Lawsuits are expensive, terrifying,
frustrating, infuriating, humiliating, time-consuming, perhaps all-consuming. Small wonder, then, that
both judges and litigants prefer settlements, which are cheaper, quicker, less public, and less all-or-
nothing than adjudications.").
83. See sources cited supra note 13.
84. See, e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (using
statistical adjudication to resolve a large number of asbestos cases).
85. But see Saks & Blanck, supra note 13, at 834-37 (arguing that sample case verdicts are likely
to be more accurate than individual trial verdicts).
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A. How the Partially Supplanting Market Works
The market would work like the supplemental market, with the following
additional rules. When the market closes, each holder of a security would be
required to announce the expected value of the security, assuming that the
price of the security would be determined by traditional adjudication. To keep
such valuations honest, some small percentage of cases subsequently would
be randomly selected for traditional adjudication.86 After the conclusion of
adjudication of such a case, those who held the securities at the moment of the
lottery announcement (in addition to receiving an amount equal to the
valuations they specified) either would pay a fine or receive a bonus,
depending on whether they had overvalued or undervalued the relevant
security." Specifically, the security holders would be required to pay (or
receive) an amount equal to the product of the inverse of the proportion of
cases selected for traditional adjudication and the amount by which the
security price at the moment of the lottery exceeded (or fell short of) the court-
determined price."5 Because traders would not know in advance which cases
would be adjudicated, this system would give them incentives to price all
securities accurately.89
86. For a thoughtful defense of random lottery-based selection of the cases to be adjudicated in
an analogous context, see Bone, supra note 13, at 638-51. Bone concludes that eah litigant "should
accept the fairness of a random lottery as a way to satisfy her process-oriented participation right." Id. at
650.
87. For an analogous approach using ex post fines to induce honest ex ante assessments, see Ian
Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L. REv. 987,
1037 (1994), which considers a scheme in which bail bonders bid for the rights to offer bail bonds. In
this scheme, a bail bonder would be fined when a defendant failed to appear by an amount equal to the
product of the bail bond and the inverse of an acceptable flight percentage set by the government.
88. For example, suppose I in 100 cases is selected for traditional adjudication, and a particular
security holder valued a security at $500, but the court awards a judgment corresponding to a security
value of $400. The security holder would then owe $100xlOO=$10,000 (but would still receive the
initial valuation of $500). On the other hand, if the judgment corresponded to a security value of $600,
the security holder would receive $10,000 (plus the $500). Naturally, the high risk inherent in such a
system might discourage small players from participating in the market, particularly since the market's
effectiveness would depend on ensuring that all shareholders could pay potentially large fees.
89. Suppose as above that the partially supplanting market uses traditional adjudication for 1% of
cases and a trader owns a security that he expects courts would value at $500. If the trader announced a
valuation of $400, then he could expect to receive $10,400 1% of the time and $400 the other 99%. With
a valuation of $500, the expected return would be $500 100% of the time. A $600 valuation would lead
to an expected return of -$9,400 1% of time and $600 99% of the time. In all cases, the expected value
is $500. Any risk-averse trader would choose the $500 valuation strategy. For an explanation of why the
assumption of risk aversion is not problematic, particularly when the market mechanism is modified, see
infra text accompanying note 101.
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1. Reducing the Mechanism's Risk Cost
This penalty/bonus mechanism, of course, increases the risk that security
holders bear.90 While traders might decrease risk by purchasing insurance, it is
also possible to alter this mechanism in ways that would eliminate much of
this excess risk. First, and most significantly, the penalty or bonus might be
based not on the ultimate judgement, but solely on the change in the value of
securities immediately after the announcement that a case was selected for
traditional adjudication (but before any announcement about which judge or
judges would hear the case). Security holders would be required to auction off
their securities (and would be prohibited from bidding on the securities they
were auctioning off). The penalty or bonus that security holders would need to
pay or receive would then be determined by the difference between their
valuations and the auction revenues, instead of the difference between their
valuations and the result of actual adjudication. This alteration would preserve
traders' incentives to price securities accurately: Once a case is selected for
traditional adjudication, no one has any incentive to bid on securities for that
case more or less than their actual value; anticipating this, traders will reveal
their true valuations before the lottery announcement. Because the lottery
announcement would in itself convey no information about the inherent value
of securities, prices would typically not change much after the announcement,
thus making the risk associated with the penalty/bonus system quite
manageable.9
Second, the courts could consist of judges who hear only claims arising
from market activity, and these judges could be required to identify the price
that the market should have selected, rather than finding entirely for either the
government or the corporation.92 For example, if there were a contested
factual issue, the market judges would be required to estimate what percentage
90. The government thus faces a tradeoff in determining the percentage of cases to adjudicate.
The more cases adjudicated, the smaller will be the risk to traders, because the penalty/bonus multiple
will be smaller. On the other hand, adjudicating more cases will require the government to fund more
judges.
91. A caveat is that bidders at the final auction would offer somewhat less than the securities'
expected value, because of the uncertainty associated with traditional adjudication. That is, if traders
believed there were a one-tenth chance that a corporation would be subject to $100,000 in liability and a
nine-tenths chance that the corporation would face no liability, securities would be exchanged at
somewhat less than $10,000. Anticipating this, the strategy of risk-averse traders valuing securities
before the lottery announcement would be to reduce their valuations to account for this effect. This will
result in a small decrease in corporations' fine liability. To compensate for the decreased liability, the
government could multiply the value at which bidders purchase securities by some factor; it could
compute this factor by considering the difference between final security valuations and actual
adjudication results over a large number of adjudications. This product would then be used to set
penalties and bonuses.
92. See infra Subsection II.B.2 (discussing why it is unproblematic for market prices to reflect
compromise on each contested legal or factual issue, instead of identifying an allegedly correct position).
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of real judges would find for one side or the other. On close issues, the judges
would essentially be splitting the difference; with more persuasive evidence,
the judges would be siding more for one side than for the other. The important
point for now is that this change in judging strategy would produce no change
in how traders priced claims. At the same time, it would reduce the amount by
which ultimate judgments would differ from expected judgments and thus
reduce market risk.93
Third, the court could simply evaluate all information that was revealed to
the market and thus not require adversarial presentation of evidence. Recall
that the market already gives incentives for the production of information and
that the purpose of the adjudication is to ensure that traders assess such
information honestly. Information that traders could not have known is
irrelevant to making sure that traders assess evidence fairly. Moreover, the
exclusion of information not released to the market means that traders will
have already had an opportunity to make arguments about the existing
evidence, thus making expensive, adversarial presentation unnecessary at the
adjudication stage.
Fourth, market judges might be required to apply a deferential standard,94
but it would be important to structure such a standard carefully. For example,
a requirement that judges defer to reasonable interpretations of the law and the
facts could be interpreted as either an objective or a subjective standard. An
objective deference standard would mean that any interpretation that was in
fact reasonable would be upheld; a subjective standard would demand
deference to any security price that traders believed to be a reasonable
prediction, i.e. that traders made in good faith. The former is inappropriate for
the market, because it provides for a range of prices that market judges would
need to defer to, which would lead traders always to price securities at the top
of this range. The latter, however, would be acceptable, because as long as
traders are in good faith trying to predict as closely as they can the judgments
that real judges would enter, any mistakes they make are as likely to lead to
errors in one direction as in the other. Penalizing such innocent errors
increases risk without affecting traders' pricing decisions.95
93. Of course, the first reform would greatly mitigate the need for the second. That is, if the
penalty/bonus mechanism were based on the difference between traders' valuations and an auction, the
idiosyncrasies of individual judges would not lead to hundredfold fines or bonuses. At the same time,
however, having judges enter probabilistic judgments would reduce the risk of those who buy securities
at auction from traders. This risk is relatively small, of course, because these purchasers would not be
subject to hundredfold fines or bonuses, but it would still reduce auction receipts somewhat.
94. Such deference would be analogous to judicial deference to administrative rulemaking. See
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (requiring
deference to any reasonable agency interpretation of a statute).
95. A counterargument to the subjective deference standard is that market judges might have
trouble distinguishing objective reasonableness from subjective reasonableness. That is, judges might
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2. Improving the Market Mechanism
The next section considers various normative objections to administrative
markets. Before replying to those objections, however, three preliminary
objections to the mechanism that makes the market work should be
considered, because the answer to each of these objections is to improve the
market mechanism.
First, is this mechanism unfair because some cases will be adjudicated by
the market itself, while others will be determined by traditional adjudication?
This criticism does not claim that the market adjudication of the bulk of cases
is inherently unfair and inaccurate, but merely that it is unfair for different
litigants to be treated differently on the basis of a lottery. A full analysis of
this fairness question is beyond the scope of my analysis here, but there is an
easy fix: Even though a small percentage of cases would be adjudicated in the
traditional manner, there is no reason that the corporations subject to
adjudication should not have their fine liability determined by the market-
clearing price of the securities, just like all other corporations. The purpose of
the traditional adjudication would then be solely to determine what penalty or
bonus to assign to traders, with the court considering all evidence that had
become publicly available. Of course, if one believes that traditional
adjudication produces better results than administrative markets but favors
administrative markets on efficiency grounds, one could create a system in
which the occasional traditional adjudication directly affected the relevant
litigants. But if one is concerned solely about differential treatment and
believes that administrative markets are fair and accurate, one should
remember that litigants need not be affected by the traditional adjudication.
Second, might some judges be able to effect their policy preferences by
entering grossly unrealistic judgments? For example, if just one in a hundred
judges believed that fines should be doubled to make some type of social
statement, that judge could multiply any fines assessed by two hundred.
Because prices are an average of what traders expect judges to do, such action
(if expected to be repeated) would double all security prices. One way to work
around this problem would be to use three-judge panels, with decisions
depending on that of the median judge. In addition, decisions reflecting very
large deviations from security prices might automatically be appealed to
courts containing large numbers of judges. Perhaps a better solution, however,
would be to constrain fines and bonuses, for example to within 25% of final
security valuations. This would prevent extreme preferences from having
find good faith simply because the traders' final valuations seemed to be within a range of
reasonableness. If judges are likely to use objective reasonableness as a proxy for subjective
reasonableness, the costs of a deference standard are likely to exceed the benefits.
Yale Journal on Regulation
undue effects. Traders' pricing would then be some compromise between
predicting what the average judge would do and what the median judge would
do.
Third, might some corporations be able to manipulate the system and
profit by trading on their own securities or even by buying up their own
securities and then undervaluing them? One worry is that corporations might
obtain windfalls by lying initially, buying up their own securities, and
admitting their lies, thus having their initially unpaid fine liability discounted
by the reward percentage. If the market is competitive, then corporations will
not be able to profit by trading on public information. 96 Therefore, the concern
must be that corporations will be able to profit by trading on private
information. This is not problematic when a corporation trades on private
information that no other trader would ever find out about, because then the
government gains if the corporation admits to having a higher-than-thought
fine liability and effectively pays most of what is owed.97 If, however, the
corporation bids on securities at auction or buys securities on the market
before other traders obtain relevant information, then the corporation may be
able to profit by raising security valuations before other traders can force the
corporation to sell the securities. The advisability of such a scheme from the
corporation's standpoint would depend on the strength of criminal and civil
penalties.98 In any case, traders would have incentives to predict such
behavior, especially if corporations tried to be repeat players, and would bid
up security prices accordingly.
The more significant worry is that a trader might have an incentive to
shade valuations of either its own securities or those of a competitor. For
example, a corporation might buy up the securities corresponding to it and
claim that they are worth nothing, but nonetheless refuse to sell them. This
would not be optimal from the perspective of making money in trading, but
96. For example, if a corporation has understated fine liability by $100,000 and everyone knows
it, then, supposing a 25% reward, the corporation would have to pay the government $25,000 at a
competitive auction for rights to the $25,000 reward. The corporation thus obtains no net benefit from
paying a competitive price at auction.
97. In effect, the administrative market provides a bonus to corporations who admit to having
higher fine liability than public information would suggest. This partial fine amnesty is somewhat more
generous than tax amnesty provisions, which allow taxpayers to admit to prior tax evasion without
penalty. See Leo P. Martinez, Federal Tax Amnesty: Crime and Punishment Revisited, 10 VA. TAX REV.
535 (1991); Bonnie G. Ross, Federal Tax Amnesty: Reflecting on the States' Experiences, 40 TAX LAw.
145 (1986).
98. A corporation's investing in its own administrative market securities might be evidence that
the corporation knowingly filed a false document indicating its fine liability. Cf I.R.C. § 7207 (1998)
(imposing criminal sanctions for filing false income tax documents). In addition, the existence of the
supplemental administrative market does not preclude the imposition of sanctions for initially
understated fine assessments. If a penalty were set equal to the reward percentage, taxpayers would have
no incentive to understate their liability in hopes of trading on it before other traders find out.
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might be optimal from the perspective of reducing fine liability. Or, a trader
might buy up a competitor's securities and incur the risk of a high valuation.
This is an important objection, but it too has an easy answer, or really two
alternative easy answers. One approach would be simply to ban self-interested
trading and assess large enough fines against violators as to eliminate any ex
ante incentive to engage in such activity.99
The alternative, and probably superior, approach would be to hold not
one, but two auctions following the closing of trading. In the first auction,
traders would sell their securities to a set of preapproved firms, which would
then announce price valuations that would determine judgments. The
preapproved firms' valuations would subject them to the penalty/bonus
mechanism based on a second auction to an independent set of preapproved
firms. Only firms that could not possibly have any self-interest would be
preapproved to bid on securities at these auctions; perhaps, for example, the
government might require that such firms (along with any related firms)
engage in no activity other than such bidding. Before the auction from traders
to the preapproved firms, traders would thus attempt to convince such bidders
that the securities they held were valuable. Self-interested trading would be
pointless, because ultimately the preapproved firms' valuations would
determine corporations' liability. Meanwhile, the first set of preapproved
firms would seek to sell securities of cases selected for adjudication to the
second set for as high a price as possible. 0
There are two side benefits to this alteration in the proposed mechanism.
The first is that only the first set of preapproved firms would end up being
subject directly to the risks of the penalty/bonus mechanism. The government
could more easily regulate such firms to make sure they would be able to pay
any penalties incurred. Traders would be subject to the risk that they would
not be able to sell their claims for as high a price as they thought, but they
would not face the possibility of a hundredfold fine should they misprice their
claims. Because of the risk associated with the penalty/bonus mechanism, the
first set of preapproved firms would not pay as much to traders as they would
99. Such fines, of course, might themselves be assessed with a partially supplanting
administrative market. For example, each trader could be subject to a large enough fine to render ex ante
unattractive a decision to trade on securities in which one has self interest. See infra Subsection 1II.A.2
(discussing how partially supplanting administrative markets can rely on vague standards). Of course,
traders in that market might themselves be subject to such fines, and so on ad infinitum.
100. The result then would be a five-stage process. First, the government would auction off
securities, and the auction winners and others could trade them. Second, when trading closed, the
holders of securities would auction off their securities to the preapproved firms. Third, the preapproved
firms who won securities at auction would announce valuations of those securities. Fourth, if a case were
selected for traditional adjudication by lottery, the preapproved firms would auction off their holdings to
the second set of preapproved firms. Fifth, these auction revenues would determine the penalty or bonus
to which the preapproved firms would be subject, and the preapproved firms' earlier valuations would
determine the corporation's liability.
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expect to obtain from the second set of preapproved firms, and traders in turn
would pay less for securities at the initial auction from the government. Thus,
the government would ultimately bear the full cost of the risks of the
penalty/bonus mechanism; these risks, however, are likely to be manageable
because the penalty or bonus will be based on the difference between the first
set of preapproved firms' valuations and the revenues in the auction from
these firms to the second set.
The second side benefit is that it eliminates any concern that traders might
be risk-neutral and thus have no incentive to price securities accurately.10' A
risk-neutral trader will be completely indifferent as to all pricing valuations,
because the penalty/bonus mechanism has no effect on a trader's expected
return, affecting only the variance of returns. Of course, all investors are
somewhat risk-averse, and there is thus no need to worry that traders would
change their valuations on a whim, especially since the amount of risk that the
market would impose on an intentionally incorrect valuation would be quite
high. There is, however, a more subtle concern-that determining the prices of
securities is expensive, and thus traders who are only slightly risk-averse may
not be willing to expend much effort. The preapproved firms solve this
problem, because in buying securities from traders at the first auction after
trading closes, the first set of preapproved firms will need to determine how
much the securities are worth. Typically, such firms would rely simply on the
values at which the securities had traded, but would have incentives to find
any instances in which such values were unreliable, for example because of
collusion among traders.
At the same time, the preapproved firms' investors will be at least
moderately risk-averse. After all, investors are generally risk-averse; if they
were not, high-risk investments would be preferred to low-risk investments
paying the same return. Of course, some individuals may have a taste for risk,
but they can indulge that taste more cheaply and directly by ordinary
gambling than by investing in a preapproved firm that will randomly deviate
from the course that even a slight bit of risk neutrality would dictate. The
preapproved firms will thus have no incentive to deviate from their honest
valuations in making valuation announcements.
101. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (explaining why risk-averse traders will have
incentives to value securities accurately).
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B. Objections to the Market
1. Accuracy
"The market makes sense only if security prices are accurate," begins one
complaint. "What if there are few traders, or if financial markets are not
efficient at pricing securities accurately?"
Of course, if security prices are arbitrary, the supplanting administrative
market makes little sense." 2 An administrative market, however, need not be
thin or uncompetitive. While the value of securities corresponding to some
corporations might be small, it is plausible that the value of those
corresponding to large corporations could be large. Moreover, some market
participants would likely trade administrative market securities corresponding
to large numbers of corporations. Because the total amount of unpaid fine
liability is large, firms would have incentives to participate in the market.
The large number of potentially outstanding securities would favor the
use of computer-aided trading, especially if the market itself were
electronic.1 °3 Corporations would have incentives to pick auditors who could
make their conclusions easily accessible and digestible; the lower the costs to
traders of processing information, the greater the probability that they will
choose to consider the information, and thus the greater effect an audit report
will have. Traders would compete with each other in developing sound
models of fine liability that take into account available evidence and the
reputation of auditors."° By showing others the soundness of their models-
102. See generally Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic
Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994) (explaining why it is important for the results of adjudication to
be accurate). The concept of accuracy applies to determining law as well as to finding fact. See John R.
Allison, Ideology, Prejudgment, and Process Values, 28 NEW ENG. L. Rev. 657, 674 (1994).
103. See Solomon & Corso, supra note 50 (discussing electronic markets); see also Recent
Agency Action, Securities Law-SEC Allows Internet-Based Trading of Securities, 110 HARV. L. REV.
959, 964 & n.51 (1997) (arguing that electronic markets are inevitable). For a more general discussion of
the impact of technology on securities regulation, see Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology
and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REv. 747 (1985).
104. Traders would have incentives to develop models overcoming biases in human cognitive
processes that lead to misassessment of information. For example, traders would have an incentive to
identify systematic biases in auditors' reports. Such information could be profitably traded on, because it
could lead to shifts in market prices for large numbers of administrative market securities. If the market
works efficiently, it would overcome flaws in how juries assess information. Cf., e.g., Scott Brewer,
Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1998) (arguing that
practical reasoners like jurors are not equipped to make sound judgments when deferring epistemically
to theoretical reasoners like scientists); George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J.
575 (1997) (claiming that although the legal system places its faith in jurors' abilities to detect lies, there
is little evidence that jurors are particularly suited for the task). For a collection of psychological essays
on how individual decisionmakers may make systematic mistakes in the assessment of evidence, see
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). In particular, see Robyn M.
Dawes, The Robust Beauty of Improper Linear Models in Decision Making, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra, at 391 (noting studies finding that linear regression models usually outperform
Yale Journal on Regulation
or, at least, the soundness of the approaches that they use to develop such
models' 5-traders could seek to convince other market players that their price
evaluations are correct.
Assuming, then, that trading is competitive, there is no reason to suspect
that market pricing of securities would be inefficient and, therefore,
inaccurate. The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) contends that
the price of a security at any time reflects all available information.0 6
Economists have defined three gradations of efficiency that a market might
exhibit: weak, semi-strong, or strong. 10 7 In a weakly efficient market, future
deviations of securities prices from long-term trends cannot be predicted from
the past price history alone." 8 In a market that is semi-strong efficient,
securities prices reflect all public information.0 9 In a strongly efficient market,
securities prices reflect all information, public and private."0 The stock market
crash of October, 1987, shook many economists' faith in the semi-strong and
strong forms of the ECMH,"' because there was no information released
immediately prior to the crash that could rationally explain so great a drop in
stock valuations. Securities' prices, many economists now believe, are not
experts in assessing quantified information); Ward Edwards, Conservatism in Human Information
Processing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra, at 359 (noting that people are too conservative
in incorporating new information into probability assessments); and Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Intuitive Prediction, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra, at 414 (discussing procedures
that can counteract defects in intuitive prediction).
105. Market participants face a tradeoff in determining whether to reveal information about their
models. On one hand, by showing the details of models, participants who have invested in developing
them are likely to be able to show that the models are sound and thus profit on securities previously
purchased using these models. On the other hand, revealing the models makes them susceptible to
copying and thus constrains their developers' ability to profit on them. By showing the process by which
it develops models-for example, by indicating to the market the prominence of lawyers and economists
on its staff-a market participant can persuade the market of the soundness of its pricing strategies
without revealing those strategies' underlying logic.
106. The seminal work introducing the ECMH is Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A
Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970), which is updated in Eugene F. Fama,
Efficient Capital Markets: 11, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1582-86 (1991).
107. For a useful introduction to the three possible variants of market efficiency, see Lawrence
A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 546, 559-63 (1994).
108. See id. at 560.
109. See id.
110. See id.
Ill. For a list of authorities critiquing the hypothesis, see Smith, supra note 26, at 411 n. 136.
Among the critical articles are Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Does the Stock Market
Overreact?, 40 J. FIN. 793 (1985); Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Further Evidence on
Investor Overreaction and Stock Market Seasonality, 42 J. FIN. 557 (1987); Wayne Joerding, Are Stock
Prices Excessively Sensitive to Current Information?, 9 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 71 (1988); Simon M.
Keane, Paradox in the Current Crisis in Efficient Market Theory, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Winter 1991, at
30; and Robert J. Shiller, Speculative Prices and Popular Models, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 55.
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necessarily equal to fundamental asset values." 2 This conclusion should
hardly be a surprise, given the long history of volatility in financial markets." 3
Even if financial markets are not efficient in the strong sense, though, they
may exhibit efficiency that is somewhere between weak and semi-strong.
While market prices may not be semi-strong in the sense of correctly pricing
all public information, market prices probably reflect a "best guess" about
market information." 4 Therefore, a single trader's assessment of underlying
valuations is no more likely to be correct than the market's." 5 This suggests,
for example, that the stock market does a better job at directing investment
than a government body could."6
If the administrative agency fully discloses its information, including its
best estimate of what corporations really owe, then the market will do at least
as well as the administrative agency alone would." 7 This is because the
112. For a debate on the question of whether stock prices reflect fundamental values, compare
Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FiN. 591
(1986), with Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Permanent and Temporary Components of Stock
Prices, 96 J. POL. EcON. 246 (1988).
113. "Casual observation suggests that the market moves up and down much more than can be
justified by changes in rationally formed expectations, or in the rates at which they are discounted."
James Tobin, On the Efficiency of the Financial System, LLOYD'S BANK REV., July 1984, at 6.
114. Tobin labeled this type of efficiency "information-arbitrage efficiency," and concluded,
"The long-standing judgment of almost all academics in economics and finance is yes, securities
markets are efficient in this sense.... As a statistical matter actively managed portfolios, allowance
made for transaction costs, do not beat the market." Id. at 5. Gilson and Kraakman restate this type of
efficiency as follows: "The common definition of market efficiency, that 'prices at any time 'fully
reflect' all available information,' is really a shorthand for the empirical claim that 'available
information' does not support profitable trading strategies or arbitrage opportunities." Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 24, at 554-55 (footnotes omitted); see also Cunningham, supra note 107, at 563-
64 (distinguishing fundamental and informational efficiency); Roe, supra note 27, at 564 (noting market
prices may be "best guess" about underlying fundamentals).
Even economists generally skeptical of market efficiency do not argue against information-
arbitrage efficiency. Lawrence Summers, for example, argues, "The standard theoretical argument for
market efficiency is that unless securities are priced efficiently, there will be opportunities to earn excess
returns.... [This] argument does not explain how speculators become aware of profit opportunities."
Summers, supra note 112, at 598. In other words, Summers believes that market participants may not be
able to obtain some information relevant to fundamental values, but he does not argue that the market
ignores publicly available information.
115. If any trader did know the "correct" pricing for securities, the trader could profit on this
information. For example, if the trader knows that a company's earnings will be higher than the market
anticipates, then he can invest in the company's stock and outperform the market. As this trader's
successes mounted, the rest of the market would copy his transactions, and the market would be strong-
form efficient. For a discussion of such derivatively informed trading, see Gilson & Kraakman, supra
note 24, at 573-75, which assesses "trade decoding" and "price decoding."
116. When government officials purport to know better than the market, traders respond
derisively. See, e.g., Greenspan Ignored: Wall Street Splurge Continues Despite Fed Chairman's
Warning, BALT. SuN, Dec. 10, 1996, at 20A (noting the stock market's return to bullishness shortly after
the Federal Reserve Chairman's characterization of traders as exhibiting "irrational exuberance").
117. The further question is whether the market would do better than judges would. Of course, if
judges have experience that is particularly useful to assessing claims, there is no reason that those (now
former) judges could not profit from that experience by trading on their abilities. The market would give
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market will deviate from the administrative agency's estimate only when it
has reason to believe that information, either released by the agency or
obtained independently, undercuts that estimate. The administrative market
will not necessary arrive at the exact "correct" fine according to the rules the
government specifies. But, assuming that administrative markets work as well
as other financial markets, the price of securities would likely produce a better
estimate of the correct fine than any single judge could.' 
18
2. Fairness
"The administrative market never declares a winner or loser in a case but
merely achieves some kind of compromise," begins a further complaint. "The
results of the market are thus not fair to anyone."
The distinction that this complaint draws is a valid one. If the market
consensus is that half of all judges would impose a fine on a corporation, then
the market will impose half of it. In traditional adjudication, the judge declares
a winner or loser on every legal and factual issue. The distinction, however,
need not be troubling. The question is whether in the face of epistemic
uncertainty about what justice requires, it is fairer to split the difference or let
the winner take all. Suppose that a legal dispute concerns whether a
corporation should receive an $x refund for overpaying a fine. Suppose that
there is a "correct" answer to this dispute, and that this answer is that the
corporation should receive the refund." 9 Suppose, however, that some portion
p of courts would decide for the corporation, with the remaining portion, I -
p, deciding against the corporation. Assessing whether the market's
compromise approach is superior to the judge's requires assessment of the
expected "error costs" of an incorrect decision. 2°
With traditional adjudication, the error cost is that the corporation will
receive none of the $x deduction 1 - p of the time; with an efficient market,
the corporation will always receive $px, which is $x - $px or $x(1 - p) less
some weight to judges' assessments, because of the judges' experience and because such assessments
are evidence of what actual courts would do.
118. This assumes that the total resource investment into the judge's decisionmaking is equal to
the quantity of resources that the market uses to adjudicate a taxpayer's liability. If a judge spends more
than the market would on assessing a given claim, then the judge might well be able to beat the market.
119. The assessment of the relative justice of the winner-take-all and splitting-the-difference
solution does not depend on who one assumes is correct, unless one further assumes that an error in the
corporation's favor is more or less consequential for justice than an error in the government's favor.
120. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 400 (1973) (postulating that legal institutions should be designed
to minimize the sum of "error costs" and "direct [litigation] costs"). One need not embrace law and
economics to use the phrase "error costs." This is merely a shorthand way of recognizing that
decisionmakers may make mistakes, and we must make some normative determination of which
mistakes are more serious than others.
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than the corporation should receive. The expected value of the refund is,
therefore, the same in both regimes, but the variance is higher in traditional
adjudication.
Although which system is more just is a normative question,' 2 ' Rawlsian
justice, which depends on risk averseness, suggests that the market approach
would be the choice made under the veil of ignorance.'22 Thus, the complaint
about the market must either be based on some non-Rawlsian conception of
justice or on the assumption that the market would not be able to estimate p.'23
If splitting the difference is superior to a winner-takes-all approach, one
might ask why courts do not adopt it.'24 The answer, the above analysis
suggests, cannot be that winner-takes-all is more just a priori.2 5
3. Jurisprudence
"We do not have judges merely to process cases," states another
complaint. "Judges produce jurisprudence, and written decisions help guide
future actions."
Indeed, a byproduct of adjudication, especially appellate adjudication, is
the resolution of legal ambiguities through written decisions, 126  which
121. Suppose any deviation from the just result imposes as great an error cost as any other. If
justice is not achieved in fill under this definition, then it does not matter how far from justice we end
up. Accepting this premise, or even one not quite so loaded, would imply that the traditional adjudicative
approach is more just.
122. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 153-55 (1971) (arguing that risk averseness is a
component of decisionmaking in the original position).
123. If the market were only weak-form efficient, see supra Subsection II.B.I, then one might
ask two questions. First, how efficient is the market's estimate of p? Second, is the market's estimate of
p biased, and if so, does this bias move the market toward or away from justice? Depending on the
answers to these questions, one might still favor the market over the courts.
124. No inherent attribute of courts requires such a binary approach. Judges could proportion
liability between two parties based on the relative persuasiveness of legal arguments. See, e.g., John E.
Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise: The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U. L. REv.
750 (1964) (arguing for non-binary decisions); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A
Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2674 (1995)
(agreeing that courts "should be allowed to render fifty-fifty or other allocative verdicts when either
unresolved factual doubt or legal ambiguities or contradictions make winner-take-all results unjust").
125. A related question in the law and philosophy literature is the normative acceptability of
"checkerboard statutes," which resolve different conceptions of justice by arbitrarily treating different
people differently. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 178-84 (1986) (arguing that the ideal of
integrity explains the intuition against such statutes); Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On
Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2091-95 (1996) (arguing that
concerns of justice may explain preference against checkerboard statutes from the original position,
assuming such a preference exists). Splitting the difference may be just even if checkerboard statutes are
not, because it approximates justice in every case. Cf. Peters, supra, at 2107-08 (noting the effects of
checkerboard statutes on probability ofjustice in particular cases).
126. One might argue for written decisions for reasons other than that they breed certainty. A
constitutional scholar, for example, has argued that the writtenness of law may be central to its
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settlements and market-based verdicts do not necessarily produce." 7 Though
at times adjudication can create the proverbial mess, particularly in economic
contexts to which common-law judges may be ill-suited,'28 it has the potential
to fill a vacuum of uncertainty with settled law. Judicial decisions are
protected by stare decisis, and the common-law method provides a reassuring
constraint on future judicial decisionmaking.
There is no reason, however, that an administrative market cannot offer
the same benefits. Adjudication may be a public good, 129 but it is a public
good that the administrative market provides in a certain percentage of cases.
Market judges can be permitted or required to write opinions, in which they
explain their assessments of the weight of different legal arguments. Indeed, if
stare decisis rules governing judges make sense, then the government could
require market judges to follow similar rules. Traders would take stare decisis
into account in rendering their decisions in anticipation of judges' doing so.
Moreover, the percentage of cases decided by market judges can be
increased to any level desired. Of course, if there were as much adjudication
as currently exists, the benefit of the market in terms of economizing on
judicial process might be diminished. The administrative agency will thus
need to balance resource costs with the benefits of adjudication. For any given
resource cost, funds in the market system might support more jurisprudence
than with courts, because the market judges would not need to spend time
trying cases. Indeed, such judges' entire job would be producing
jurisprudence. Judges would need to devote some portion of their written
opinions to making factual determinations based on the evidence produced by
the market process, 3 ' but they would not need to devote any time to creating
evidence by hearing witnesses and to dealing with procedural niceties. Judges
could thus devote the bulk of their time to pure legal analysis.
legitimacy. See Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119, 1164-69
(1995) (arguing that writtenness is central aspect of American constitutionalism).
127. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) ("A settlement will
thereby deprive a court of the occasion, and perhaps even the ability, to render an interpretation."); see
also Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 102, 114-19 (1986)
(noting that settlements do not produce written opinions); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases
Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339 (1994) (arguing that
settlement may not always be desirable). But see Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For
Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985) (criticizing Fiss for criticizing ADR).
128. Cf James S. Eustice, Tax Complexity and the Tax Practitioner, 45 TAX L. REV. 7, 15
(1989) ("[A]d hoe answers to specific narrowly defined issues in the context of an adversary proceeding
... create[] a mess. Thus, it is not surprising that the vast outpouring of tax law cases in certain areas
tends eventually to become overwhelming to the point of near meaninglessness.").
129. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 235, 238-39 (1979) (arguing that adjudication should perhaps remain a public good because of the
positive externality benefit of the rules it produces).
130. See supra text in paragraph preceding note 94.
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At the same time, the market mechanism itself might produce a sort of
jurisprudence of its own.'31 Corporations making business plans would not
need to rely only on the small subset of cases that result in published
decisions, as they do now. As long as market transactions are public, firms
could also look to cases that the market resolved without any adjudication.
Corporations would be able to research how traders predicted the ways in
which judges would respond to legal issues. Indeed, these corporations could
look at the legal arguments that traders offered to support various positions.
Although the market effectively forces the settlement of all claims instead of
the traditional adjudication of all claims, the prices at which it settles claims
could produce useful information.
One counterargument combines the objection about jurisprudence with
that about fairness. Jurisprudence, the counterargument goes, is impossible in
any system in which judges do not announce winners and losers on every,
legal issue. This argument, though, is not persuasive. First, the market rules
could provide for market judges to announce who the winner would have been
on a particular legal issue. Future judges would then be obliged to give full
stare decisis effect to the legal determination.
Second, like judicial decisions, stare decisis need not be a binary decision.
Judges could, for example, be required to average their assessments of the
weight of evidence with those of prior decisionmakers. Indeed, one could even
imagine giving some stare decisis weight to the market's assessments of legal
issues in cases not ultimately traditionally adjudicated. Potential litigants
would realize that market judges might deviate somewhat from past
determinations, but the small effect that this would have, given such a rule of
stare decisis, would provide potential litigants with any needed certainty.
Moreover, the possibility that judgments may differ by small amounts in a
large percentage of cases may be no worse than in our current system, in
which there is always a small chance that a clear legal decision will be
overruled.
4. Process
"Adjudication is not just about making sure everyone pays the right
amount," according to a fourth complaint. "It is about providing a process in
which real people have other real people hear their complaints."
131. Cf Luban, supra note 82, at 2620 ("Is there a jurisprudence of settlements waiting to be
invented?").
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Perhaps there is something about a judge in a black robe and a room with
walnut furniture that litigants find comforting. 132 Even if a party loses, at least
a judge has heard its claims, and litigants have received a fair shake. 133 If this
is so, however, one of two factors must account for it. First, people may feel
that courtroom adjudication is fair because it does in fact produce just results.
But if this is so, we should expect that they would be equally pleased with the
market, assuming, as argued above, that it would likewise produce accurate
results. Second, perhaps litigants attribute a majesty, accuracy, and fairness to
the legal system beyond what it actually possesses. And perhaps they would
be distrustful of the market, even if it were in fact accurate and fair.
Alternatively, adjudication may have an "expressive function" that transcends
the goals of doing justice in a particular case and setting precedents for future
judges.1 34 If this were so, this would ultimately be a factor that we would need
to balance with any advantages the market provides.
Independent of people's perceptions about the legal system, however,
there is no reason to think that people would be less likely to be heard in the
market than in a traditional adjudicative system. Indeed, the contrary may be
true. With traditional adjudication, judges and juries regularly make factual
determinations that are effectively unreviewable, 135 and appellate judges, in
the federal judiciary at least, have considerable discretion in reaching legal
conclusions because the Supreme Court cannot review every case.'36 Even
when, barring dismissal'37 or summary judgment,'38 a judge and a jury must
hear a litigant's claims, there is little that the litigant who feels that the
decisionmakers have ignored relevant arguments can do.'39  In an
administrative market, by contrast, traders will have an incentive to seek out
and listen to litigants who feel that their meritorious claims and arguments
132. But cf Arthur A. Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 995 (1978) (developing an extended
metaphor comparing litigation to a game involving "Trial Champions," i.e. lawyers, and "quasi-sacred
functionaries," i.e. judges).
133. Civil law protects the "right to be heard." See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1994) ("[P]arties may
plead and manage their own cases personally or by counsel .... "); Helen B. Kim, Note, Legal
Education for the Pro Se Litigant: A Step Towards a Meaningful Right to be Heard, 96 YALE L.J. 1641,
1641 n.2 (1987) (listing analogous state provisions).
134. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021 (1996).
135. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (requiring an appellate court to defer to facts found by district
court unless clearly erroneous).
136. Cf Sanford Levinson, Strategy, Jurisprudence, and Certiorari, 79 VA. L. REV. 717 (1993)
(book review) (describing the Supreme Court's certiorari policy).
137. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
138. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
139. Cf MARVIN FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 13 (1980) ("The deciders, though commissioned
to discover the truth, are passive recipients, not active explorers. They take what they are given. They
consider the questions raised by counsel, rarely any others. Issues not joined are not resolved, though
they might have led to wiser, fairer dispositions than those reached.").
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have been ignored. Because litigants are uniquely positioned to be able to
identify flaws in traders' analysis of their claims, traders will want to listen to
them and consider their arguments, particularly where the facts are murky.
Just because an administrative market may involve computerized
securities trading does not mean that it is inhuman. The computer and the
market are tools, and real people utilize them. Of course, courts might well
hold that administrative adjudication violates the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 4° But as Jerry Mashaw has noted, the
clauses are an "interpretive placeholder around which or within which to
structure our most general constitutional conversations about the evolution of
American government."'4' Ultimately, we cannot answer whether
administrative markets afford due process by pointing out that they are
different from courts; we must explore how they are different, and what these
differences will mean for litigants.
III. Changing the Law: Administrative Markets' Dynamic Possibilities
Would we want administrative markets even if they were perfectly
competitive as well as semi-strong efficient? The analysis so far has suggested
that the answer might be "yes": Administrative markets encourage private
individuals to obtain and release information to the market and thus provide a
more sophisticated information-harnessing mechanism than qui tam suits. An
administrative market might be cheaper than traditional adjudication,
depending on the value of the reward percentage the government sets.
Because the fixed cost of bringing a particular legal claim in administrative
markets is low, such markets may be more capable than the courts of handling
areas of law involving large numbers of claims but small individual dollar
amounts.
So far, however, the analysis has shown only the ways in which
administrative markets might prove to be useful procedural tools and has
assumed that the advent of administrative markets would have no effect on the
substantive law. This part modifies this static analysis, showing that the
existence of administrative markets would change regulators' incentives and
140. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
141. JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 8 (1985). Mashaw, of
course, is a leading advocate of the position that administrative adjudication is not just about accuracy,
but also about preserving individual dignity through process. See, e.g., id. at 168-69; Jerry L. Mashaw,
The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 49-56 (1976) ("State coercion
must be legitimized, not only by acceptable substantive policies, but also by political processes that
respond to a democratic morality's demand for participation in decisions affecting individual and group
interests."); see also Allison, supra note 102, at 680-82 (discussing "noninstrumental values" of
adjudicative process, including individual dignity).
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thus would have dynamic benefits. Indeed, it argues that the knowledge that
an administrative market will be used to adjudicate claims might make writing
regulations easier. Administrative markets are thus responsive to the final
scarcity concern that I set out at the beginning of the Introduction,'42 the
shortage of experts to conduct rulemaking.
In traditional administrative adjudication, the courts serve as a
background decisionmaker, and the administrative agency and the regulated
entity negotiate in their shadow.'43 By contrast, the administrative market fully
adjudicates all cases, estimating the expected value of the fine liability that
corporations would have to pay if courts adjudicated all cases. This eliminates
one party's ability to win concessions from a party with limited resources by
threatening litigation. Section III.A shows that a shift to administrative
markets would make general legal standards more attractive relative to
detailed legal rules. This would enable agencies to promulgate less complex
rules and allow administrative law to extend into realms in which traditional
administrative regulation would be too inefficient. Building on this analysis,
Section III.B explains how vague standards could be used to ease legal
transitions and thus make efficient legal change more feasible.
A. Replacing Rules with Standards
Consider the strengths and weaknesses of standards in a traditional
adjudicative system.1" Unelaborated standards are useful in traditional
adjudication because they prevent corporations from taking advantage of
loopholes in rules.'45 Suppose, for example, that the tax code did not use
depreciation schedules, instead allowing taxpayers to deduct economic
142. See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
143. Cf Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (introducing the concept of negotiations that occur in the
law's shadow).
144. See generally Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974) (assessing the choice between rules and standards); Peter H.
Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1992) ("Dense
rules ... seek to control a broad range of conduct, which causes them to collide and conflict with their
animating policies with some frequency."); id. at 4 ("Turning on diverse mixtures of fact and policy,
indeterminate [stand,,'rds] tend to be costly to apply and their outcomes are often hard to predict."); cf
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court-1991 Term, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HARV. L. REv. 22 (1992) (exporting the rules-standards debate to constitutional law). But cf
Kaplow, supra note 5, at 593-96 (arguing that standards are not necessarily more complex than rules). A
set of rules that corresponds perfectly with policy objectives may be said to be "congruent" to those
objectives. Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 67 (1983).
In many contexts, however, such congruence may be very difficult to achieve.
145. A loophole is "[a] way of escaping a difficulty, especially an omission or ambiguity in the
wording of a contract or law that provides a means of evading compliance." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 1061 (3d ed. 1992) (emphasis added). In other words, a loophole is a rule that allows a
regulated entity to escape an obligation that an ideal set of rules or a vague standard would impose.
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depreciation146 and requiring judges to compute such depreciation using
general economic principles on a case-by-case basis. Computing economic
depreciation depends on a variety of factors, and a model appropriate for some
depreciables might be inadequate for others. The advantage of the vague
depreciation standard is that judges would be able to make computations of
depreciation ex post, and they would not need to set forth in advance all
possible ways of classifying depreciables. Recognizing that judges would be
making decisions ex post, corporations would no longer have incentives to
identify instances where the application of a detailed rule is inconsistent with
the general principle it was drafted to implement.
141
Such a standard, however, would be wildly impractical, at least in a
traditional adjudicative system. Standards are unpredictable, and
unpredictability leads to litigation. Asked to compute economic depreciation
case-by-case, different judges might make different assumptions and obtain
different results in like cases. Litigation would result if the tax authority and
the taxpayer had different predictions about the probability of litigation
outcomes, or if strategic bargaining prevented settlement.1 4' Recognizing that
the administrative agency has limited resources, corporations would interpret
the economic depreciation standard quite favorably to themselves. The agency
would then have to settle for a lower amount than it could otherwise obtain.
Rules, by contrast, do not allow for as much interpretive flexibility, and thus
prevent the strategic bargaining that hamstrings administrative agencies.1
49
146. See Anthony P. Polito, Fiddlers on the Tax: Depreciation of Antique Instruments Invites
Reexamination of Broader Tax Policy, 13 Am. J. TAX POL'Y 87, 93-96 (1996) (discussing how current
depreciation rules differ from the economic depreciation approach).
147. For example, suppose that a corporation considers purchasing good A or good B, and
assume that both are identical for all the corporation's purposes, but that A receives more favorable tax
treatment under a fluke in the depreciation rules. The corporation will be willing to pay more for A, thus
causing an economic distortion. With a vague economic depreciation standard, by contrast, the company
would have no reason to anticipate more favorable treatment for A and would thus not make a tax-
motivated decision. See, e.g., Kevin W. Cunningham, Note, Which Concept of Depreciation Should
Guide Us? Trying to Develop a Consistent Framework for the Federal Income Tax System, 14 VA. TAX
REv. 753, 754 (1995) (discussing an example of the problems that may occur when depreciation rules
stray from economic fundamentals).
148. See Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias in
Litigation, 1993 U. Cm. L. SCHOOL ROUNDTABLE 75, 84-87 (discussing strategic bargaining).
149. Strategic bargaining is more likely given standards than rules. Consider, for example, the
following account of the "bilateral monopoly" problem, which similarly can result in strategic behavior
during negotiations: "Because there is no competitive pressure from outsiders, each party is likely to
bargain 'strategically'-asking much, offering little, bluffing, threatening to walk away from the deal-
in an effort to get as much as possible." JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 137 n. 17 (3d
ed. 1993). Legal settlement can be seen as a type of bilateral monopoly situation, since both parties
would like to settle but may behave strategically in an effort to obtain a greater percentage of the
benefits of settlement. With unambiguous legal rules, however, it is more difficult to "bluff' and to
"threaten[] to walk away from the deal," because such a threat would not be credible if it were clear that
the administrative agency would win in court.
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 15:197, 1998
The IRS, recognizing its limited enforcement resources, has thus wisely
chosen to administer economic depreciation through rules.15°
An administrative market retains the benefits of standards without their
weaknesses. Standards are an even better antidote to loopholes in an
administrative market than in a system of traditional adjudication. The benefit
of breaking standards down into rules does not exist in an administrative
market, because rules would not lower the amount of litigation or otherwise be
more administrable than standards. While a judge in a case selected for
traditional adjudication in an administrative market might attempt to model a
particular standard, if a later case revealed that this model was inadequate, the
judge would have an incentive to adjust the model. In other words, the weight
of precedent would be lighter in an administrative market. than in traditional
adjudication, and this would make standards more effective. Traders would
anticipate this and dynamically improve their models in order to capture the
intuition of a standard, thereby thwarting a corporation that relied on past
models as a way of getting around a standard.
At the same time, standards do not cause the problems that rules cause in
an administrative market. Because market prices reflect a composite of
different ways of implementing a standard, 5' the administrative market would
Even with limited enforcement resources, the agency should be able to induce all corporations to
settle if liability is unambiguous. As long as the agency can make a credible threat to prosecute certain
corporations, those corporations will settle. Because the agency's threat is credible and the law is
unambiguous, they would otherwise end up paying the same amount directly to the agency, plus the
costs of litigation. After the agency induces one group of corporations to settle, it could move on to the
next group. This would ultimately lead to an unraveling that will gradually induce all corporations to
settle. Of course, in practice, some corporations might prefer litigation even though it will be more
expensive, but these corporations will be few, because such behavior is irrational when the result of
litigation is wholly predictable. Where there is an ambiguity in how much corporations owe, however,
the agency is less well situated, because it will be unable to distinguish genuine threats not to agree to a
settlement (which might stem from asymmetric predictions of litigation outcomes) from bluffing. Thus,
even if the agency could credibly commit to insisting on a certain settlement amount, a number of
corporations will not settle, thereby preventing the unraveling effect.
150. See I.R.C. § 168 (1998). To be sure, case law would develop and judge-made formulas
would gain power through stare decisis. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 5, at 577 & n.46 (noting that
precedent may convert standards into rules). Those formulas, however, would reflect a tradeoff between
administrability and economic substance. Traditional adjudication breaks difficult-to-administer
standards into more easily administered rules, even if this simplification means that the rules sometimes
do not correspond to the intuitions that the standards represent. But see Jason Scott Johnston,
Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts Process: An Economic Analysis of Legal Form, 76 CORNELL L. REv.
341, 362-66 (1991) (arguing that adjudication may cause chaotic shifts from rules to standards and
back).
151. Because market prices reflect an average of a number of traders' views, they provide a
solution to a classic problem of politics and adjudication: how to develop an objective measure of the
quality of an argument. Cf R.S. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR
ACT 18 (1983) ("[C]onsider the differences between national policymaking and the National
Pastime.... Everyone knows that George Brett is a better hitter than Mark Belanger because Brett's
average is higher. ... In the world of politics, though, batting averages are harder to compile."). By
Market-Based Administrative Enforcement
save the administrative agency and its litigation opponent from the whim of a
single judge.152 In addition, the result of traditional adjudication of randomly
selected cases does not directly affect any corporation's fine liability, so a
judge faces no tension between ex ante and ex post justice.'53 In an
administrative market, judicial decisions are neither ex post adjudications nor
ex ante rules. To be sure, such decisions may help unmask judges' thought
processes and thus influence market participants trading in their shadow, but
their only immediate legal effect is to discipline traders."'
That standards are more efficient in administrative markets than in
traditional administrative adjudication points to two ways in which
administrative markets could have a dynamic effect on the law. As Subsection
III.A. 1 shows, agencies might reduce the complexity of regulations, allowing
the markets to fill in details of vague regulations. Subsection III.A.2 argues
that the legislature could create administrative schemes that would rest
entirely on individual vague standards.
1. Reducing the Complexity of Regulations
Because administrative markets make possible the replacement of rules
with standards, they allow for reduction of legal complexity. Environmental
law, for example, is dauntingly complex.' Much of the complexity comes
from elaboration of definitions that seem straightforward but require myriad
distinctions. 5 6 Attorneys who specialize in government contracts, meanwhile,
forcing traders to consider and weigh the force of different interpretations, administrative markets
provide a partial solution to the problem Melnick identifies.
152. In traditional adjudication, the unpredictability of a legal standard is problematic not only
because it leads to litigation, but also because it may impose uncertainty costs on litigants.
153. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1281, 1282-84 (1976) (explaining how the public law model of litigation focuses on creating ex ante just
law, while private law litigation seeks to achieve justice ex post); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court,
1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 36 (1979) (comparing the goals of
ex ante and ex post justice in judicial decisionmaking). For a useful categorization of the literature, see
Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439,
455 n.69 (1990).
154. See supra Section II.A.
155. See, e.g., Bradley C. Bobertz, Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws:
Reflections on Scapegoating Theory, 73 TEX. L. REV. 711, 712 (1995) ("Throughout the Gordian
passageways of environmental law, one repeatedly confronts the arbitrary, the unintelligible, and the
futile. Environmental statutes have been called, among other things, 'hollow,' 'mind-numbing,' and the
product of pathological law-making.") (citations omitted); Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of
Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO.
L.J. 2407, 2428-40 (1995) (suggesting that complexity in environmental law stems from technicality,
indeterminacy, obscurity, and differentiation).
156. See Lazarus, supra note 155, at 2431 ("There are rarely clear threshold levels at which
environmental pollution becomes unacceptable. The legal system, therefore, draws lines that tend to be
based on fairly arbitrary distinctions."); id. at 2433 (describing the difficulty of determining whether
material is a "hazardous waste").
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like to joke about the irony of the singular name of the Federal Acquisition
Regulation, which includes hundreds of pages identifying which expenses are
"allowable costs" for which the government will reimburse contractors. 157
In these areas and in others, law could be reformed by substituting
straightforward definitions for elaborate ones, vague generalities for
regulatory minutiae. In assessing how broad standards should be, the
government would still need to balance the benefits of certainty with those of
succinctness. Without the cost of litigation brooding as an omnipresent factor,
though, the optimal level of detail would be less than with traditional
administrative rulemaking.
Such a change would not make the law less complex; it would instead
shift the task of making fine distinctions from regulation drafters to traders,
who would not need to anticipate all contingencies ex ante. The sacrifices that
judges accept to reduce litigation-such as the creation of rules that are both
overinclusive and underinclusive'58 and the maintenance of bad rules for the
sake of stare decisis' 59-are not necessary if traditional litigation no longer
dominates the adjudicative process.
2. Creating Purely Standards-Driven Markets
Just because administrative markets could lead to simplification of
regulations does not necessarily mean that it would be advisable to boil down
all administrative programs into single lines like, "Polluters shall pay." With
such a vague rule, corporations would not be able to predict their fine liability
easily. In considering whether to adopt such drastic simplification,
policymakers would need to balance its benefits against the cost of increased
uncertainty. There may, however, be circumstances in which purely standards-
driven markets, i.e. markets that operate under the guidance of a single general
rule, might be useful. In particular, when a standard would be intuitively
157. See, e.g., Robert A. Burton, Business Combinations: Treatment of Costs on Defense
Contracts, 24 PUB. CONT. L.J. 217 (1995) (providing an illustration of the complexity of allowable costs
law).
158. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 150, at 363 ("[T]he more specific a rule, and the more
heterogeneous the world it regulates ... the greater the costs of overinclusion and underinclusion....
[B]alancing under a general standard will also involve overinclusion and underinclusion when the legal
process is imperfect.") (citing Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 144, at 263-69); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems
with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 992-93 (1995) (discussing the overinclusiveness and
underinclusiveness of rules).
159. A judge who believes that there is a better alternative to an old holding may nonetheless
invoke stare decisis for one of two reasons. First, litigants may have formed expectations around the
existing regime. Second, stare decisis makes the outcome of litigation more certain and thus encourages
settlement. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 125, at 2039 (listing consequentialist justifications for stare
decisis). The market could take into account the first of these concerns. See infra Section III.B. At the
same time, the market would minimize the second concern by making outcomes less susceptible to the
predilections of individual decision makers.
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useful but too vague for traditional adjudication, and that standard cannot
easily be approximated by a series of bright-line rules, 6 ° an administrative
market may be a viable alternative.
Consider, for example, the evils of corporate tax avoidance.' 6' Corporate
taxpayers have incentives to structure transactions for tax purposes and to
look for loopholes in the tax code. Tax planning may often serve an
economically useful purpose; if the legislature wishes to use the tax code to
grant breaks for certain types of transactions, then it may be socially desirable
to have lawyers and accountants act as economic facilitators by figuring out
what those transactions are. 162 Past a certain point, however, the expenditure
of resources to determine what breaks a taxpayer could qualify for may not
justify the social cost of any improved fairness that results from taxpayers'
identifying the lowest tax that they legally must pay (or can get away with
paying). 63 Because a corporate taxpayer receives the full private benefit from
its tax planning, the taxpayer will often have an incentive to expend resources
beyond this point. While some transactional restructuring may contribute to
achievement of the tax code's goals, if the economic cost of the restructuring
is almost as great as the tax break, then the social costs may outweigh the
social benefits.' 6 Indeed, tax litigation may constitute tax avoidance, if the
160. This characteristic is particularly evident in the case of corporations spending money on
loopholes, discussed below. After all, if the tax code could unambiguously identify what constitutes a
loophole, none would exist.
161. The phrase "tax avoidance" is used in contradistinction to both "tax evasion" and "tax
planning." The salient characteristic of "tax avoidance" is the attempted circumvention of legislative
intent. See Hoffman Fuller, The Intent to Avoid Tax, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2103, 2106 (1996) ("[L]egislative
purpose is the avowed key to the distinction between prudent tax planning and tax avoidance."). See
generally George Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd. Identifying and Controlling Income Tax
Avoidance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 657 (1985) (attempting to define avoidance and assessing strategies for
combating it).
162. For a detailed and careful development of the position that lawyers may serve a useful
social role, see Frank B. Cross, The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Economists: An Empirical
Evaluation of the Effect of Lawyers on the United States Economy and Political System, 70 TEX. L. REV.
645 (1992). Cross argues that lawyers' activities fit in three categories: "redistributive, rent-seeking
activities; productive, economically facilitating activities; and creation of nonmarketed social goods." Id.
at 653. These activities are difficult to distinguish, and it is hard to imagine rules encouraging lawyers to
engage in work fitting in the second and third categories but not in the first.
163. Learned Hand famously wrote, "Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be
as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not
even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes." Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934),
aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). Judge Hand's assertion, however, ignores the social costs of tax planning.
164. If a tax break is designed solely to compensate a taxpayer for a social benefit, then as long
as the value of the social benefit is at least as great as the tax break, taxpayers have no incentive to spend
wastefully. However, tax breaks may reflect fairness considerations as well as rewards for socially
desirable activity. Cf., e.g., Bernard Wolfinan, Tax Expenditures: From Idea to Ideology, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 491 (1985) (reviewing STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985))
(discussing the history of and debate on tax expenditures). When tax planning exceeds the reward
portion of a tax break, this additional spending may or may not be excessive on fairness grounds.
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social benefit from the taxpayer's contesting the government's claims is less
than the social cost.
Suppose therefore that tax avoidance is defined to include all socially
unjustified activities undertaken for tax purposes. The problem with tax
avoidance is not a problem with the substantive tax law, though tax
simplification and elimination of loopholes could conceivably diminish
corporations' incentives to engage in tax evasion. The problem, instead, is
better labeled as procedural: that corporations may spend a socially excessive
amount of time studying the substantive tax code. There is thus no way to
modify the substantive tax law to eliminate corporate tax avoidance under this
broad definition, and it would thus be impossible to construct a series of
bright-line rules that would unambiguously indicate when a corporation had
engaged in tax avoidance. Though one might imagine a brute-force solution,
such as imposing a tax on tax planning services, administrative markets offer
an alternative.
Imagine an administrative market, relying on the above definition of tax
avoidance, that contained one simple provision: "Any corporate taxpayer
engaging in tax avoidance shall be fined just enough so that corporate
taxpayers will have no ex ante incentive to engage in such behavior." If there
were such a standard, traders in the administrative market would develop
models to measure tax avoidance and to determine how much such avoidance
should be punished. To determine the appropriate tax penalty, the market
would likely assess the ex ante probability that a corporation's tax avoidance
would succeed.165 If the market functioned efficiently, taxpayers would have
no incentives to engage in tax avoidance. Because challenging the market's
fine assessments excessively might itself constitute tax avoidance, taxpayers
would similarly have incentives to invest resources in persuading the market
that it overestimated liability only when the social benefits of such behavior
outweighed the costs.
16 6
There are at least three possible objections to such a rule. First, measuring
tax avoidance is a terribly imprecise business. But that is a strength of the
market, not a weakness. Each market participant will attempt to aggregate
different approaches to the problem of defining tax avoidance, and the market
price (assuming it is efficient) will in turn reflect an aggregate of these
165. To make a taxpayer indifferent about whether to engage in tax avoidance, the taxpayer who
is ex ante more likely to succeed should receive a larger fine ex post.
166. For example, while a taxpayer might ordinarily have incentives to pay $10,000 for an audit
the result of which he expects to reduce his tax liability by that amount, such a contract might not be
optimal from a social point of view. If the definition of tax avoidance is sufficiently broad, the market
would penalize the taxpayer for hiring too expensive an auditor.
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aggregations.167 Of course, market participants will attempt to guess how those
who might judge randomly selected cases would model the problem of tax
avoidance, and such judicial behavior might become more predictable over
time. Nonetheless, without the constraint of precedent, judges' incentives
would be to improve on their models to adjust for changing circumstances,
and market participants would have incentives to predict such adjustments.
Moreover, unlike the result of any single judge's measurement of tax
avoidance, the market price will be an estimate of what an average judge
would do. So even if each judge decided tax avoidance cases based on
kneejerk reactions to the facts of individual cases, the price would reflect a
collective attempt to quantify judges' intuitions with respect to tax avoidance
behavior. And, unless judges systematically underestimate or overestimate the
consequences of tax avoidance, this estimate will reflect the actual costs of
such behavior.
Second, the rule might impose penalties that are too large to be justified
on fairness grounds, as a few unfortunates would pay for the sins of others
whose tax avoidance was not perceived.'68 But this is not an argument against
the administrative market; it is just an argument for an even vaguer standard.
For example, the standard could be, "The administrative market shall
optimally fine taxpayers who engage in tax avoidance." Market participants
(and judges in randomly selected cases) would then give content to the word
"optimally." Specifically, traders would have to predict the amount by which
judges are likely, given this standard, to reduce fines because of fairness
considerations.
B. Smoothing Legal Transitions
Purely standards-driven administrative markets could help smooth legal
transitions and thus make efficient legal change less controversial and more
likely to occur. This could happen in two different ways. First, the government
could use an administrative market to provide side payments to corporations
(and perhaps others) who are hurt by legislation, thus neutralizing groups that
would otherwise oppose legislative reforms.
Suppose, for example, that a certain health care reform would harm
certain hospitals, even though it would improve overall efficiency. The
167. "[I]n a market with low transactions costs, market prices should serve as a good aggregator
of the information possessed by other traders. Indeed, under the right assumptions, no trading at all is
required in order for market prices to react to new information." Paul G. Mahoney, Is There a Cure for
"Excessive" Trading?, 81 VA. L. REv. 713, 723-24 (1995) (citations omitted).
168. Cf Jonathan Skinner & Joel Slemrod, An Economic Perspective on Tax Evasion, 38 NAT'L
TAX J. 345, 346 (1985) ("In general, there will be some tradeoff between severe penalties, which impose
ex ante costs on all risk averse tax evaders, and greater auditing and detection programs, which entail
more government resource costs.") (citation omitted).
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government could provide that those hurt by the legislation shall "be fully
compensated." Such a standard would be quite difficult to administer within a
traditional administrative apparatus, as political factors would likely distort
the accuracy of the compensation program. An administrative market,
however, could administer the program relatively free of political interference.
The hospitals would be required to tell the government how much they were
harmed by the legislation, and a purely standards-driven administrative market
would then be used to impose fees that effectively reduce the amount that the
hospitals would receive. 6 9 As long as there is no reason to think that the
judges of the claims randomly selected for traditional adjudication will
systematically overvalue or undervalue the amount to pay hospitals, the
market could provide full compensation fairly accurately.
Second, the government could smooth the legal change associated with
the introduction of a partially supplanting administrative market. Specifically,
a vague standard could be attached to a partially supplanting administrative
market requiring that judges take into consideration the benefit of continuity
with the regime that existed before the market. With such a "stability
standard," the government could ease the transition to an administrative
market in which standards replace existing rules. 7 ° An alternative approach to
smoothing transitions would be to delay the standards' effective date.' 7' But
judges would respond to the stability standard by considering the costs of
transition and balancing appropriately the results under the existing law and
under broad standards, and traders would have incentives to figure out what
169. More speculatively, the government could provide a standards-driven market that would
fully compensate anyone hurt by a change in legal regimes. Under Kaplow's analysis, see infra notes
172-173 and accompanying text, such full compensation would be undesirable, because without it
investors are forced to consider the possibility of changes in governmental policy. The government
could, however, offer a standards-driven market for specified purposes not limited to any single
legislative act. For example, a standards-driven market might compensate corporate taxpayers for
adverse changes in any tax incentive programs. Kyle Logue has argued persuasively that the benefits of
governmental precommitment to such tax breaks are likely to exceed the cost. See Kyle D. Logue, Tax
Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L.
REv. 1129 (1996). While Logue considers various mechanisms to attain precommitment, see id. at 1181-
94, a standards-based transition-compensation mechanism might be more credible than any he suggests.
170. One type of volatility that the market can create is institutional. Changing from an imperfect
but reliable system of courts to an untried market-based system entails considerable uncertainty costs.
No market rule can eliminate costs associated with the implementation of the market. Policymakers can
smooth the transition by experimenting with gradually more encompassing versions of the
administrative market, but an affected corporation accustomed to the traditional system will nonetheless
have to pay the price of leaming the new one. The purpose of this subsection is not to argue that
transition to a market would be costless. Rather, the argument is that the market could ease transitions
among legal regimes, including the transition from rules to standards.
171. Transitional clauses are a common means of easing transformation from one political
regime to another. See Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political




the average transition adjustment would be. Corporations could therefore
expect to be able to compute their fees initially using existing formulae and
would have time to adjust to the new system.
The administrative market thus provides a means of gradual transition
from one regime to another, preventing abrupt changes in policy. One might
argue that such gradualism is in fact a problem with the administrative market.
In an important article, Louis Kaplow argues against transitional policies that
cushion the effects of economic reform.'72 Of course, an efficient market
would consider this analysis and perhaps make more abrupt policy shifts.
Kaplow's argument, however, does not necessarily apply to the administrative
market in any case. One reason that pricing changes in the administrative
market would probably not be abrupt even in the absence of a stability
standard is that the market weighs different normative positions. The relative
appeal of different positions to judges will often change slowly in tandem with
evolving approaches to legal thought. Similarly, if a transition from regime A
to B to A again would impose some transitional cost, it might be advisable to
switch from A to B gradually, so that switching back becomes more palatable.
When policymakers are uncertain about which policy course is best,73
perhaps the gradualist, compromise approach exemplified by the
administrative market is appropriate.
IV. Comparing Alternatives: Administrative Markets and Other Market
Incentives
In sketching out how administrative markets would work and how they
would change the incentives of regulators, I do not mean to suggest that
administrative markets are the solution to every regulatory problem. Rather, I
hope to add the administrative markets to the menu of regulatory approaches
that policymakers may consider. In the taxonomy of Susan Rose-Ackerman,
regulation can be command-and-control, performance-based, or incentive-
based.'74 Properly conceived, administrative markets are not a fourth category
to add to this taxonomy, but constitute an alternative to traditional
administrative enforcement and adjudication that can be used to complement
any of these approaches. A regulatory regime could consist of a command-
and-control approach enforced through an administrative market, or it might
172. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509
(1986). But see Logue, supra note 169.
173. Kaplow assumes that a planned change in policy is normatively desirable. See Kaplow,
supra note 172, at 521. This is a key assumption in any real legislative context, since legislators should
perhaps take into account that their successors after the next election might disagree with them.
174. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 19, 155-56.
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consist of an incentive-based approach enforced through traditional
administrative processes.
Administrative markets are likely to be most appealing to those who have
faith in market incentives generally, and administrative markets may often be
used to accomplish the same goals as market incentives that are currently
proposed. This part compares administrative market solutions to various
regulatory problems with standard approaches relying on market incentives.
At the same time, this part attempts to sketch out why an administrative
agency might address a given regulatory problem with neither a standard
market incentive nor an administrative market, and why it might use both a
standard market incentive and an administrative market to address the same
problem.
The three market incentives considered are tradeable emissions permits to
combat pollution, full insurance requirements to ensure workplace safety, and
excise taxes on products like cigarettes that force consumers to internalize
externalities. In the case of each of these incentives, the following tentative
conclusion is reached: To the extent an administrative market is used merely.
to give incentives to actors in primary markets, the indirectness of
administrative markets is likely to mean that standard market incentives are
superior. Administrative markets, however, are useful where a standard
market incentive would prevent an agency from considering important
noneconomic goals, or where an agency faces a large enforcement problem
that a standard market incentive cannot overcome.
A. Tradeable Permits to Reduce Pollution
In a tradeable permit system,'75 the government allocates rights to pollute
by, for example, auctioning off such rights. A pollution right entitles a firm to
emit a specified amount of pollution in a given year, and the government
directly controls only the total amount of pollution that will be permitted.
Firms are then permitted to trade their rights to pollute on the market. The
administrative agency monitors corporate emissions and sues any corporation
that pollutes more than it is permitted.
Tradeable permits have two primary benefits over traditional command-
and-control environmental regulation. First, the tradeable permit system eases
the government's enforcement burden, because it is generally easier to
measure emissions than to inspect whether firms comply with best available
175. See generally T.H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADINGS: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING
POLLUTION POLICY (1985); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:
The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988).
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technology requirements.'76 Second, firms will sell their permits when they
can reduce pollution for less money than they will receive for the permits.
Thus, the reduction in pollution will be borne by those firms that can reduce
pollution most cheaply, while the firms that obtain the greatest benefits by
polluting will continue to pollute.'77
An administrative market enforcing command-and-control regulations
would achieve some of the same goals as the tradeable permit system, but
probably not as efficiently. The system would reduce the agency's
enforcement burden by giving private parties incentives to produce relevant
information about corporations' activities. 7 8 At the same time, regulators
might choose to draft less detailed regulations in an administrative market,
perhaps allowing corporations more flexible ways of reducing pollution.'79
Indeed, one might imagine a purely standards-driven pollution
administrative market that seeks to achieve the same outcome as does the
tradeable permit system. The standard might simply specify: "Corporations
shall be fined enough so that their incentive is to emit the same amount of
pollution as they would under a tradeable permit system." Such a market,
however, would operate only indirectly upon polluters. Suppose, for example,
that a corporation knows that for some relatively small amount of money, it
could greatly reduce the amount of pollution it emits. It would have no
incentive to release that information in the standards-driven market, whereas
with tradeable permits, it would then be in the corporation's interests to sell its
pollution rights. Of course, traders in the administrative market would have
incentives to accumulate such information, but they may not be as well
situated as the regulated industry itself to obtain it.
This problem exists, however, only when the goal of the administrative
market is to achieve the exact same results as a tradeable permit system. An
alternative would be to operate an administrative market around a standard
specifying that each firm should pay for the damage it does to any natural
resources. To be sure, firms might still have incentives to hide some
information about the natural resource damage.' 0 But as long as they expect
the administrative market's assessment of the natural resources damage to be
unbiased, firms would have incentives to reduce pollution whenever the
marginal benefits exceed the marginal damage to the resources. Moreover, the
176. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 175, at 184-85; Richard B. Stewart, United States
Environmental Regulation: A Failing Paradigm, 15 J.L. & CoM. 585, 594 (1996) ("Under pollution fee,
tradeable permit, and deposit/refund systems, government officials no longer have to gather information
and make numerous decisions regarding complex engineering and economic issues for a myriad of
facilities across a vast and diverse nation.").
177. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 175, at 180.
178. See supra Part 1.
179. See supra Subsection III.A.1.
180. But see supra Subsection I.B.2.
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administrative market system is more flexible than a tradeable permit system.
Suppose, for example, that policy makers would like economic dislocation of
workers to be a factor in determining which firms reduce pollution. An
appropriately worded administrative market standard could accomplish this. In
a tradeable permit system, by contrast, the firms that reduce pollution will be
those that can do so most cheaply, regardless of any third-party effects on
workers.
An administrative market could, in any case, be used to enforce the limits
of a tradeable permit system. Thus, third parties would have incentives to
monitor the emissions of corporations to ensure that they stay within the limits
of their tradeable permits. Traders could profit by showing that the market had
misvalued the amount of fines the corporation owed. Whether an
administrative market is a useful addition to a tradeable permit system for a
particular type of pollution depends on the empirical challenge that the
government faces in monitoring compliance. If measuring emissions is
straightforward, then the administrative market would add little. If, by
contrast, emissions measurement is a difficult and expensive science,181 or if
corporations are able to evade detection of pollution, the benefits of an
administrative market might well exceed its costs.
B. Insurance Requirements for Workplace Safety
Another market-oriented regulatory tool is a requirement that firms bear
adequate insurance for any liability that they might incur. As long as firms or
their insurance companies can pay for any torts they cause, for example, the
firms will be prodded by their insurance carriers to take all cost-justified
measures to reduce liability. For example, in the area of workplace safety and
health regulation, government regulation would be unnecessary if all firms
were strictly liable for any workplace injuries or illnesses, as long as the firms
are not judgment-proof. This section compares such a full insurance
requirement and an administrative market approach to each other and to
conventional command-and-control regulation.
Before I explore these approaches, however, I should explain the
economic justification of why we need workplace safety regulation at all. In a
perfectly competitive labor market with fully informed, rational workers and
zero transactions costs, wage differentials will compensate workers for
different levels of risk.8 2 Where these conditions do not exist, however,
181. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 226 (2d ed. 1988) (noting
that it may be cheaper to check for installation of pollution-control technology like scrubbers than to
measure emissions).
182. See W. Kip Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim
Compensation and Risk Regulation, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 53, 56 (1984) ("Under ideal conditions of full
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workers may be exposed to excess risk for which they are not compensated.
For example, workers may be irrational and discount the probability of injury
or illness.'83 Because information is a public good, workers may have
inadequate incentives to acquire it and thus may be inadequately informed
about the risks they face.'84 Similarly, workplace safety may be a "local public
good," making it difficult for individual employees to negotiate for safety
improvements where collective negotiation is impossible.' 5 Thus, risk may be
too high for any given wage. The goal of efficient regulation, then, is to lower
risk so that the marginal benefit of additional risk is equal to the marginal cost.
An administrative agency regulating workplace safety and health via
command-and-control regulation8 6 faces two critical scarcity problems that
market solutions might solve. First, the large number of workplaces means
that the regulator faces a massive enforcement problem.'87 Second, the
diversity of workplaces means that the regulator cannot develop perfectly
tailored safety requirements that motivate employers to achieve safety and
health goals at the least possible cost.
An insurance requirement would mandate that employers purchase
insurance that would fully compensate workers for the injuries or illnesses
information and voluntary job choice, workers will demand and receive a wage premium for risky
jobs.").
183. As cognitive psychology reveals, people generally underappreciate the relevance of low-
probability, high-cost events. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits
of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REv. 211, 223 (1995) ("[L]aboratory results consistently demonstrate that even
when offered subsidized premiums, people prefer to insure against high-probability, low-loss hazards
and tend to reject insurance against low-probability, high-loss hazards.").
184. See Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA 's Critics and Regulatory Reform, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 606 (1996); Viscusi, supra note 182, at 58 ("Even with some information
about the hazards of workplace materials, the worker is still in a poor position to assess the health risk he
faces and to evaluate that risk in monetary terms."). One limitation of this economic justification for
market intervention is that it does not necessarily explain why workers' estimates of risk should be
biased downward in addition to being inefficient. That is, in the absence of information, rational
employees should recognize the absence of such information and be just as likely to overestimate risk as
to underestimate risk. There may, however, be an informational asymmetry. That is, the employer may
have a better idea of risk levels than employees and release this information to employees only when it
indicates that risk is lower than employees would otherwise guess. Cf. Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Progressive Law and Economics-And the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 355 (1988)
("Knowing that they must compensate workers to take risks, employers would like to keep job hazards
secret.").
185. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 184, at 356.
186. In the workplace safety context, command-and-control regulation means that the regulator
specifies particular safety precautions and standards by which firms must abide, rather than providing
performance incentives for firms to improve safety as cost-effectively as possible.
187. See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 184, at 608 ("Unfortunately, the agency lacks adequate
resources to be effective in many industries."); cf id. (suggesting that workers be allowed to bring
private enforcement actions to help solve the enforcement problem).
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they develop because of work.' Such an insurance program, however, would
need to compensate employees for more than their lost wages; it would also
need to provide compensation for pain and suffering." 9 Ideally, the insurance
payoff should be enough to make the worker whole.' 90 Employers could be
allowed to self-insure, as long as there were no risk that insolvency would
prevent the payment of damages.'91
Differently stated, making employers strictly liable for damages from
workplace-related injuries and illnesses would give such employers incentives
to reduce risk whenever the benefit of such a reduction to workers would
exceed the cost to the employer.' 92 More importantly, insurance companies
would have incentives to monitor workplace risk to set actuarially fair
premiums. Because individual insurance companies would service many
employers, they would also have incentives to invest in information about risk
reduction. 1
Interestingly, the leading academic critic of OSHA regulation, W. Kip
Viscusi, does not recommend a market incentive program requiring full
188. More precisely, the insurance would need to compensate workers or their estates for the
portion of damages they suffer due to injury, illness, or death that is attributable to work-related
conditions.
189. Cf Steven P. Croley & Jon P. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-
Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1785 (1995) (providing a rebuttal to the argument
that because there does not appear to be a market for pain-and-suffering insurance, an efficient
adjudicative system would not provide pain-and-suffering damages).
190. The calculation is somewhat more complicated in the case of a worker fatality, since
presumably no amount of money would make a worker whole. If internalization of costs is the goal,
however, the appropriate insurance payoff in the event of an employee's death would be equal to the
statistical value of life. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 15-16 (1993) (arguing
that the concept of "statistical lives" is a useful benchmark for considering policies). Thus, if an
employee would accept a known 1/10,000 risk of death only for an additional $500 in present discounted
value, then the insurance policy would pay $5,000,000 if the employee died. Technically, it is not
necessary that such insurance payments actually be made to the employee's estate, if the goal of the
insurance program is to reduce risk such that the employer internalizes its cost. Payments could be made,
for example, to the government. Consideration of whether the employee's family should receive
survivorship benefits depends not just on distributional concerns, but also on enforcement concerns,
because the employee's family might be better positioned to file and pursue an insurance claim.
191. But cf Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996) (arguing that
many potential tortfeasors are effectively judgment-proof or can make themselves judgment-proof).
192. To see that this is so, suppose an employer must choose whether to eliminate a 1/x risk of
damages y (in present discounted value) for present cost c. If the employer is profit-maximizing, it will
choose to eliminate the risk when c <y/x.
193. This helps to compensate for the fact that information about risk reduction is a public good.
Unless insurance companies develop mechanisms by which they share all information, however, it does
not resolve the problem entirely. Some government expenditures might usefully be spent on research
into workplace risk. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 184, at 359 ("[T]he government should
sponsor research designed to discover the level of risk posed by various substances, tools, capital
equipment, and generic work practices.").
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insurance.'94 In criticizing insurance, however, Viscusi does not appear to
recognize the possibility of a mandatory insurance regime.'95 Viscusi does,
however, offer several comments that help to establish some properties of a
full insurance system that may be undesirable, properties that I will show the
administrative market solution would avoid. First, causation may be difficult
to prove.' 96 Second, some injured parties may fail to bring claims.' Third, if
employers face strict liability, a moral hazard problem may lead to employee
risk taking. 9 '
Despite these problems, though, a full insurance requirement would
substantially address the two primary challenges of workplace safety
regulation. By giving private insurers incentives to monitor workplaces, the
government would need only to monitor whether firms purchased appropriate
insurance. Moreover, the private insurers would have incentives to price-
194. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance,
Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 67-68
(1989). Indeed, Viscusi's solution contains surprisingly little reliance on market forces: "My proposal
... includes: 1) a compensation system such as the social security disability program, funded primarily
by its broad-based payroll tax; 2) a set of informational requirements to inform workers more fully about
workplace hazards; and 3) a direct regulation scheme that integrates minimum performance standards
and graduated hazard penalties." Viscusi, supra note 182, at 79. To be sure, "graduated hazard penalties"
would give employers incentives to reduce risk, but such a system would depend on the government's
ability to measure hazards.
195. Viscusi notes: "The inadequacy of the insurance market aggravates the effects of the lack of
implicit risk markets. A number of factors impede the development of efficient insurance
agreements.... [A]dverse selection ... can prevent the emergence of any insurance coverage for
important classes of risk ..." Viscusi, supra note 194, at 67-68. Adverse selection, however, would not
occur if all employers were required to purchase insurance. In a longer treatment of workplace risk,
Viscusi appears to recognize the possibility of a worker's compensation program that would provide
more than partial insurance. See W. Kip VISCusI, RISK BY CHOICE 90 (1983) ("[l]f the market levels of
risk are too high, it may be desirable to increase benefits above their efficient level or to levy an
additional accident-related tax on firms to promote safety."). He does not explain, however, why he
believes private markets-regulated only to the extent that the government would need to assess the
adequacy of insurance-would be inefficient. While Viscusi argues that it may be inefficient for workers
or their estates to receive full compensation, see id. at 89, such full compensation would be efficient in
the sense of providing employers with appropriate risk incentives.
196. See Viscusi, supra note 194, at 73 ("The greatest inefficiencies occur in the tort system
because the claimant must establish liability through an evidentiary showing. The information required
is much greater than that for simply assessing a probability distribution for an outcome, as is the case
with markets.") (footnotes omitted). As long as juries compensate only the portion of damages
attributable to workplace causes, however, the possibility that individual awards may not be perfectly
accurate does not change the risk-reducing incentives of insurance. As long as jury awards are not
systematically biased up or down, employers and insurers will have appropriate incentives ex ante. (If
juries were systematically biased in favor of employees, then employers would excessively reduce risk
in a full insurance regime.)
197. See id. at 83. This would be particularly likely when employees receive full compensation
from private health and disability insurance (unless the private insurance carrier can sue the employer's
insurance carrier), and when employees die with no heirs.
198. See id. at 68. But see McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 184, at 604 ("[T]he moral hazard
theory reflects a bizarre view of human nature under which the prospect of money in the future will
persuade people to risk severe pain, hospitalization, dismemberment, and even death in the present.").
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discriminate against more risky workplaces, at least where the cost of
identifying workplaces as risky is less than the benefits.'99
An administrative market approach, relying on the market to enforce
existing (or modified) safety regulations, responds to both aspects of the
agency's workplace safety and health conundrum as well. First, the system
addresses the enforcement problem by giving workers and third parties
incentives to inspect workplaces. Of course, some workers might not have the
requisite technical expertise or might not be able to afford to purchase large
numbers of securities from other security holders. A third-party inspector,
however, would have incentives to provide rewards to employees who come
forward with information that the inspector could then verify.2"'
Second, and more subtly, the system responds indirectly to the problem of
customizing workplace safety and health regulations to diverse
circumstances.20' Detailed workplace safety and health regulations are
problematic because the command-and-control standards might not be
appropriate for all workplaces. 2 The administrative market will give
regulators incentives to draft simpler regulations.0 3 The agency is still
unlikely to choose the simplest regulation imaginable--"each employer shall
be fined the optimal amount to encourage efficient elimination of risks"-but
regulations might be drafted at a level of specificity between this extreme and
the current level of detail.
Ultimately, assessing the success of an administrative market approach to
workplace safety and health regulation is an empirical project. The
administrative agency would need to consider, among other factors, the costs
of adjudicating a small percentage of cases chosen by lottery. The
effectiveness of third-party inspections depends in part on how effectively the
market can assess the reputations of various inspectors, and on whether the
market will be robust enough to encourage formation of a competitive
199. Private monitoring by insurance companies is unlikely to be perfect, of course, particularly
with respect to health and safety issues for which the cost to the insurance provider of monitoring
insured companies' activities is high.
200. In a perfectly competitive inspection market, inspectors' reward offers would be equal to
the expected profit from the information. Of course, the inspection market would not be perfectly
competitive, and the expected profit may be lowered by some employees' providing inaccurate
information that increases inspectors' costs. Because employees with information about violations
would thus be unable to obtain the full value of that information (unless they trade on the information
themselves), their incentives to accumulate information would not be as large as the third-party
inspectors'.
201. This problem may be greater in the case of workplace safety regulation than in the case of
workplace health regulation. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 182, at 80 (noting that it is relatively easy to
measure compliance with performance standards in the context of health regulation, for example by
determining "concentrations of cotton dust fibers in the air").
202. See supra text accompanying note 187.
203. See supra Subsection III.A.I.
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inspection industry. The benefits in terms of reduced complexity depend
inversely on the extent to which the desire to reduce businesses' uncertainty
costs explains the complexity of regulations.
It is possible, however, to make a theoretical comparison between the
insurance approach and the administrative market approach. The insurance
approach ties the penalty system to a compensation system.204 The desirability
of the insurance approach thus depends critically on the acceptability of the
compensation system.205 For example, one might or might not deem it
normatively unacceptable to make large cash payments to the survivors of
workers killed on the job. As long as the compensation system is acceptable,
however, the insurance approach is likely to achieve the goal of regulation-
efficiently safe and healthy workplaces-at a lower cost than an
administrative market could. Employers are in a better position than traders in
an administrative market to know which changes will improve safety and how
expensive they will be; they will expect to reduce their liability burden (and
indirectly, their insurance burden) by making cost-justified safety and health
improvements.
By contrast, the administrative market approach acts independently of a
compensation system. This approach, accordingly, is more flexible: Because it
merely encourages enforcement of safety regulations, the market could be
used to implement noneconomic values as easily as economic ones. Suppose a
legislature decided, contrary to the advice of economists, that it wanted to
equalize risk, to the extent possible, for all workplaces at some preset level.
Such a decision might be consistent with a view, for example, that differential
safety rates for different social classes promote class tension and are thus
damaging in a democratic civil society. An administrative market could
accommodate such a judgment by enforcing stricter regulations than
economists would recommend. The insurance approach, on the other hand, is
not quite so flexible. To use insurance to equalize risk among workplaces, the
insurance policies would need to pay amounts not equal to the damages
suffered by injured workers. But to determine these amounts, the government
would need to be able to calculate the risk of all workplaces, defeating the
204. Consider each of the concerns with the standard market approach discussed above:
causation problems, underenforcement, and moral hazard. See supra notes 196-198 and accompanying
text. That causation would pose a difficult factual question is problematic only because causation would
determine whether (or how much) an employee could recover. Underenforcement will exist only to the
extent that employees decide not to seek compensation. Moral hazard will occur because the insurance
means that insured, employers and employees know that they will receive compensation regardless of
what risks they take after purchasing insurance.
205. Viscusi, for example, generally favors compensation of victims through "a social insurance
fund financed by a general payroll tax." Viscusi, supra note 182, at 77. If national health and disability
insurance is desirable, then the government will be unable to implement the standard market approach,
since that approach would leave no need for private insurance.
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purpose of the insurance approach relative to command-and-control
regulation.
The choice, however, is not necessarily between the insurance and
administrative market approaches. The government can use both of these
approaches or neither, or limited versions of one or both. Thus, if the
insurance approach would achieve the optimal outcome, but the administrative
agency cannot easily enforce compliance with the insurance requirement, a
combination of the two types of incentives might be superior to either type of
incentive alone.2" And where the hierarchical structure of a command-and-
control regulatory regime itself promotes efficiency,2 7 a more traditional
regulatory program may be superior to both market alternatives, or such a
program could be supplemented with moderate versions of both types of
market incentives.
C. Excise Taxes on Dangerous Products
Another market-oriented approach to regulation is to impose excise taxes
on products to force consumers to internalize the costs of those products. A
so-called Pigouvian tax,2"' if set at an appropriate level, can force consumers
to pay for the effects of products on third parties as well as effects on
themselves that they might underestimate. For example, in the context of
cigarettes, consumers may not take into account the costs that smoking
imposes on third parties, such as their families or strangers at the next table in
a restaurant.209 A Pigouvian tax represents a form of ex ante regulation
responding to such informational externalities, in contrast to an enterprise
liability regime that accomplishes regulation through ex post assessments.
206. An administrative market scheme could be used to enforce the rule that employers obtain
adequate insurance, with traders obtaining information on the adequacy of employers' insurance
coverage. Even if this is a manageable task for an administrative agency, it is possible that traders would
achieve better results, particularly if the agency faced political pressures to conclude that employers'
insurance coverage was adequate. Cf. Alex M. Azar II, Note, Firrea: Controlling Savings and Loan
Association Credit Risk Through Capital Standards and Asset Restrictions, 100 YALE L.J. 149, 157
(1990) (noting that agencies may face political pressures to determine that an institution has taken
adequate financial precautions).
207. This might be true of workplace safety and health regulation if there are large economies of
scale in producing information about risk. Both types of market incentives rely on numerous private
parties-insurance companies or security traders-to produce information about risk. On the other hand,
private businesses arguably tend to be more efficient than government agencies. As Cohen and Rubin
argue: "Profit maximizing firms have incentives to reduce monitoring costs, without necessarily
decreasing monitoring ability, by developing new technologies, bargaining for cheaper labor, or
eliminating unproductive employee or management practices. The incentives for a budget-maximizing
bureaucrat, however, are just the opposite." Cohen & Rubin, supra note 18, at 187 n.68.
208. See, e.g., Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30
J. ECON. LITERATURE 675, 680 (1992).
209. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for
Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1186-88, 1229-32 (1998).
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Jon Hanson and Kyle Logue, however, have recently offered a trenchant
critique of Pigouvian taxes in the cigarette context.21 The problem with such
taxes is that they impose heavy demands on regulators. A regulator must be
able to make difficult computations about the total costs of cigarette
smoking.211 Moreover, for the regulatory regime to induce efficient safety
improvements on the part of cigarette manufacturers, regulators would need to
be able to differentiate among different cigarette brands' safety levels.2"2
Cigarette manufacturers would have incentives to suppress information
indicating that their cigarettes were dangerous.
Administrative markets offer an alternative mechanism for accomplishing
ex ante product regulation. Each manufacturer could be required to pay
annually an amount equal to the total costs imposed by its products not taken
into account by consumers. Administrative markets could be used to
adjudicate manufacturer liability. Any single trader, of course, is no better
situated than a regulator to determine how dangerous individual brands of
cigarettes are. But the administrative market would create competition among
traders to refine models indicating the costs imposed by different brands. In
addition, if cigarette smoking by certain individuals were more costly than
smoking by others, the market could take into account these differences, and
manufacturers would have incentives to respond in their marketing practices.
As long as the tobacco companies expect judges who ultimately adjudicate
such claims to produce unbiased estimates of the costs of cigarettes, they will
have incentives to make efficient safety improvements. Moreover, the
manufacturers would raise their prices because of the fines.
This does not, of course, mean that ex ante regulation through an
administrative market is superior to ex post incentive-based regulation, which
Hanson and Logue advocate.213 After all, assuming that problems like the
possibility of judgment-proof tobacco companies can be overcome,
214
manufacturers would have incentives to make all efficient safety
improvements if they were strictly liable for the costs of cigarettes. This
provides another example of how incentives directly on producers are likely to
be more efficient than those operating on traders. The argument does,
however, make the comparison somewhat closer, particularly given that the
administrative market might be a better mechanism for compensating for
210. Seeid. at 1268-71.
211. See id. at 1270 ("In sum, with respect to the information that she needs to do her job, the
ideal Pigouvian regulator is in essentially the same position as the ideal command-and-control
regulator.").
212. See id. at 1271-73 (arguing that this would discourage manufacturers from exercising
efficient levels of care).
213. See id. at 1273-78.
214. See id. at 1307-12.
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third-party effects.215 At the same time, administrative markets could enhance
Hanson and Logue's proposal for a "smoker's compensation" system 2 6 as a
way of administering an ex post regime, thus strengthening their argument for
the superiority of ex post, incentive-based regulation even more.
Conclusion
The simple market mechanism that I introduced in Part I has developed
over the course of my analysis into one that increasingly subsumed functions
of administrative agencies. In Part I, the market served only as a supplement
to traditional administrative adjudication. This supplemental market allowed
trading of portions of legal claims that the government had against
corporations, and it served to encourage the production and release of private
information about corporate fine liability. A corporation, however, could still
negotiate with an agency and ultimately force the agency to court.
That right was removed in Part II. The partially supplanting market which
it introduced allowed only a few randomly selected fine disputes to be
adjudicated in courts, but it used that small amount of adjudication as a way to
induce traders to price administrative market securities as if all cases would be
adjudicated. The security prices thus predicted what the outcome of
adjudication would have been and were used as a substitute for adjudication
itself.
Finally, in Part III, the content of the law itself changed. Because the
partially supplanting administrative market adjudicates all claims, regulators
no longer needed to worry that vague provisions would place the agency in a
poor negotiating position, given the large volume of potential litigation.
In future work, I will take this project one step further, by showing how
even the small amount of adjudication that indirectly powers the partially
supplanting market could be eliminated. As Part IV showed, however, this
radical step need not be taken to unleash the virtues of administrative markets.
The administrative market responds to all three types of scarcity that
administrative agencies face. The supplemental market encourages private
investigation of corporations until the costs eclipse the benefits, as moderated
by the reward percentage. This solves administrative agencies' enforcement
problem. The supplemental market also increases corporations' incentives to
settle with the agency, and the partially supplanting market builds on this by
adjudicating cases without always relying on courts to make decisions when
settlement fails. This addresses the scarcity of prosecutorial and adjudicative
215. See id. at 1312-13 ("To the extent that the dispersed problem cannot be eliminated through
the aggregation of claims, however, some state-initiated regulatory approach may be a useful supplement
to a victim-initiated ex post regime.").
216. Id. at 1283-96.
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resources. Finally, the dynamic benefits of the partially supplanting market
make regulations easier to draft, addressing the scarcity problem that limits
regulators' ability to draft adequate regulations.
Although I have developed a market-based replacement for adjudication
specifically in the context of corporate fine collection, the concept may be
generalized. A similar market scheme could be sketched for virtually any area
of civil law, whether or not the government is a party. For example, one might
create an administrative market mechanism as a substitute for class action
litigation.1 7
The goal of law and economics is sometimes seen as the creation of legal
rules and processes that mimic the market.218 My analysis has flipped this
perspective, asking whether a market could mimic the result of legal
proceedings.219
I have focused on the assessment of corporate fees rather than on some
other area of the law for two principal reasons. First, with traditional
administrative adjudication, the amount of money corporations end up paying
in taxes is the product of the interaction of many different players-
legislators, regulation drafters, enforcement investigators, lawyers, and
administrative courts. In their most developed form, administrative markets
would change the incentives of all these players and take over some of their
functions.
Second, and more importantly, the corporate fine administrative market
may be less intrusive than other forms of administrative markets, such as a tort
liability market or a tax liability market that determines the tax liabilities of all
individual tax filers. After all, many corporations are subject to the whims of
capital markets already, and administrative markets could target particular
types of activities. Moreover, administrative markets give private parties
incentives to accumulate and release information concerning individual
217. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 83-85 (explaining the advantages of the partially
supplanting administrative market over statistical adjudication).
218. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the
Economic Approach to Law, 68 CAL. L. REv. 221, 222 (1980) (characterizing positive law and
economics as being concerned "with the capacity of market models to provide a conceptual apparatus
within which traditional legal problems may be conceived").
219. My argument thus does not entail the end of adjudication, but to the contrary shows how
market processes might provide alternative means of structuring it. As Carrie Menkel-Meadow recently
wrote:
Adjudication is necessary to generate rules and norms, and to exist as a final resort when the
parties cannot resolve things themselves .... The interesting question for me, then, is not
what we will do when adjudication ends, but when and how should we use adjudication and
when should we use something else? And, must adjudication be structured the way it is?
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Introduction: What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? A Brief Intellectual
History of ADR, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1613, 1623 (1997). My analysis has aimed towards addressing these
questions.
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market litigants. Corporations are not generally thought of as having a right to
privacy, and indeed, private monitoring of corporate activity is often
something that the government seeks to encourage.
Although our society relies on capital markets to make important
decisions about the use of social resources, 220 my proposal may nonetheless
seem to take the market mantra to an extreme. I have tried to show, however,
that by firmly anchoring the market to traditional administrative adjudicative
processes, we can accomplish the goals of adjudication better than traditional
administrative adjudication can, without perverting those goals. And while the
administrative market itself may require some regulation-agencies would
need, for example, to send traders checks or provide them with electronic
payments when the market closes-this degree of regulation is trivial relative
to the bureaucracy that it has the potential to decrease.
An administrative agency, in short, can be effective even if it is small. Let
the market roar, and administrative law will roar with it.
220. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?-Derivative
Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 Nw. U. L.
REV. 987, 987 (1992) (noting that securities regulation depends on the premise that individual investors
maximize their own returns, thus maximizing social wealth).
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